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Straight Outta SCOTUS: Domestic
Violence, True Threats, and Free Speech
JESSICA MILES*
Domestic violence intersects with constitutional,
criminal, and civil law in ways that often present challenges
for jurists seeking to reconcile conflicting interests in
promoting victim safety and protecting the legal rights of
those accused of abuse. One current issue presenting such
tensions relates to “true threats” of violence which the U.S.
Supreme Court considers to be among the categories of
speech receiving only limited First Amendment protection.
The Supreme Court has yet to indicate what level of intent
would be constitutionally sufficient for conviction of a
speaker of a true threat and the circuit courts have split on
this issue. While a decision on the constitutionally requisite
mens rea for a true threat will impact a broad range of
individuals and groups, it will have a substantial effect on
domestic violence victims. Domestic violence victim
advocates have generally argued that offering minimal free
speech protections for true threats will best serve victims’
interests and, in the context of civil protection order cases,
this approach is indeed optimal. However, victims hold
varying perspectives on the desirability of criminal
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prosecution as a response to domestic violence. Moreover,
rhetorical threats of violence can add value to political
protest speech, as seen in rap music and other art forms, and
thereby aid efforts to combat broader societal problems
which contribute to domestic violence. As a result, a low
mens rea standard for true threats in all cases would
undermine the goals of many domestic violence victims and
could chill public dissent on issues impacting them.
Supreme Court precedents addressing other categories
of unprotected speech, particularly defamation, offer useful
guidance on the resolution of this question. Specifically, the
Court’s caselaw suggests that applying a heightened mens
rea requirement for public protest context threats—threats
against public officials or figures communicated in a public
forum as part of a discussion on matters of public concern—
versus lower intent standards for threats in other contexts
represents the optimal balance between protecting threat
victims and respecting free speech rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence advocacy in the United States over the last
several decades has produced sweeping legal changes in numerous
areas including family law, immigration, and civil protection orders,
bringing substantial relief to many victims.1 As Congress and state
legislatures have acted to combat domestic violence, courts have
been presented with difficult questions related to balancing the
promotion of safety for domestic violence victims with the
protection of constitutional rights for those accused of abuse.2 First
Amendment speech protections currently exemplify one such area
of tension. In recent years, defendants in a number of criminal
prosecutions and civil protection order cases have raised free speech
1

See, e.g., Green Card for VAWA Self-Petitioner, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-vawa-selfpetitioner (last updated July 26, 2018) (explaining path to citizenship for victims
of domestic violence under the Violence Against Women Act); Catherine F. Klein
& Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis
of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993) (providing a
survey of civil protection order statutes in all fifty states); Nancy K.D. Lemon,
Statutes Creating Rebuttable Presumptions Against Custody to Batterers: How
Effective Are They?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 601, 606–13 (2001) (describing
developments and implementation of rebuttable presumptions against award of
custody to batterers in many states).
2
See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832–33 (2006); Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57, 60 (2004); United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177,
188–89 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae of the American Civil
Liberties Union et al. in Support of Petitioners at 17, Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813 (2006) (No. 05-5224) (“Davis and Hammon illustrate the similar
pressure on courts to expand the definition of ‘nontestimonial.’”); Brief of Amici
Curiae the National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. in Support of
Respondents at 16, Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (No. 05-524)
(“Adopting an overly expansive view of ‘testimonial’ statements . . . will convert
this ‘shield’ into a sword to be wielded by batterers to silence their victims . . . “).
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arguments when accused of threatening, stalking, or harassing their
current or former intimate partners.3 Domestic violence victims are
increasingly facing threats via the Internet and social media
platforms, further clouding the lines between constitutionally
protected speech and acts of abuse subject to legal regulation.4
For example, consider the case of Melissa, a high school senior
who just went through a bad breakup with her boyfriend, Anthony.5
One morning, Melissa gets texts from several friends stating that
Anthony has just posted a new rap song on his public SoundCloud
page that does not mention Melissa’s name but uses language
suggesting that he’s threatening her. Melissa then visits Anthony’s
SoundCloud page and sees that Anthony has changed his profile
picture—it now shows him holding a gun pointed at the camera. She
plays the new song and hears Anthony rapping the following lyrics:
You fucked up my life
Put a knife in my lungs
I don’t give about a fuck about a bitch
Pull my gun

3

See, e.g., State v. B.A., 205 A.3d 1130, 1134 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2019) (rejecting a defendant’s challenge to stalking statute as vague and
overbroad in violation of the First Amendment in a domestic violence case);
People v. McPheeters, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)
(concerning a defendant who argued that the trial court erred when it failed to
instruct the jury to consider free speech arguments in a prosecution based on the
defendant’s threat to kill his ex-girlfriend in front of a police officer); State v.
Oliveros, No. 28935, 2010 WL 3433557, at *9 (Haw. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2010)
(concerning a defendant who argued that the trial court failed to comply with First
Amendment requirement to instruct the jury of an objective standard for true
threats in the prosecution of the defendant for threatening to kill his girlfriend).
4
See Megan L. Bumb, Domestic Violence Law, Abusers’ Intent, and Social
Media: How Transaction-Bound Statutes are the True Threats to Prosecuting
Perpetrators of Gender-Based Violence, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 917, 929 (2017) (“A
survey conducted by the National Network to End Domestic Violence in 2012
revealed that . . . almost 90% of [domestic violence] agencies had had victims
report being threatened through technology; one third of those threats occurred on
social media and Facebook.”).
5
Melissa is a fictional name, but her experiences are based on the lives of
women I have represented in practice.
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Put it to your fucking head
Now you’re dead
My shit is too hot though
Guns to your head
El Chapo
Melissa agrees with her friends that the song is about her, and
she is frightened. Melissa seeks a civil protection order against
Anthony. Anthony argues that he is an aspiring rapper with a First
Amendment right to post the new song—which he claims is about
no one in particular—and that the Constitution prevents the court
from using his lyrics as the basis for an order against him. In
deciding whether to enter a civil protection order against Anthony,
the court must somehow reconcile the goal of domestic violence
prevention and the protection of free speech rights.6
The U.S. Supreme Court announced that “true threats” were
among the categories of speech left unprotected by the First
Amendment in a 1969 per curiam opinion, Watts v. United States.7
However, the Court in Watts did not define “true threats.”8 The
Supreme Court next addressed the issue of true threats in 2003, in
Virginia v. Black, commenting that “true threats encompass those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious
6
Abuse Defined: What is Domestic Violence?, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
HOTLINE, https://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined/ (last visited
Jan. 2, 2020) (“Domestic violence (also called intimate partner violence (IPV),
domestic abuse or relationship abuse) is a pattern of behaviors used by one partner
to maintain power and control over another partner in an intimate relationship.”).
Use throughout this Article of the female pronoun to refer to plaintiffs or domestic
violence victims and the male pronoun to refer to defendants or perpetrators of
domestic violence reflects recent statistics indicating that approximately 85% of
victims are women and the vast majority of perpetrators of domestic violence
against women are male. See Alissa Scheller, At Least A Third of All Women
Murdered in the U.S. Are Killed By Male Partners, HUFFPOST,
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/men-killing-women-domesti_n_5927140 (last
updated Dec. 6, 2017). This usage is not intended in any way to deny or minimize
the plight of male or non-binary victims or the problems of female or non-binary
perpetrators.
7
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
8
See generally id.
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expression of an intent to commit an unlawful act of violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals.”9 Beyond that
sentence, however, the Court gave little attention to the definition of
true threats, ultimately deciding the case on unrelated grounds.10
Following Watts, many circuit courts adopted an “objective test” to
determine whether a statement constituted a true threat, 11 and the
circuits have continued to utilize this test following Black.12 Under
the objective test, the fact finder asks if a reasonable listener, or, in
some jurisdictions, a reasonable speaker or a reasonable person,
would find the communication at issue to be threatening.13 The
objective test does not address the mens rea of an individual speaker
accused of uttering a true threat.14 In contrast to the general
consensus on applying an objective test to true threats,15 the circuit
courts split sharply on how to treat the element of the requisite,
subjective mens rea of the speaker.16 State courts have split on this
issue as well.17
9

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (explaining that the speaker
need not intend to carry out a threat; rather, it is enough that disruption and fear
were caused by the true threat).
10
Id. at 347–48 (resolving the case by holding that the statutory provision
was unconstitutional because it treated “any cross burning as prima facie evidence
of intent to intimidate”).
11
See, e.g., United States v. Alabound, 347 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003)
(“Thus, the offending remarks must be measured by an objective standard.”).
12
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981, 987 (11th Cir. 2013)
(finding that Black did not introduce a subjective test for true threat analyses);
United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 508–09 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that Black
did not implement a subjective test, thus applying an objective true threat
analysis); United States v. Fuller, 387 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2004) (describing
the inadequacy of a subjective test).
13
See infra Section I.A; see also Paul T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and
the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1235 (2006) (“The test typically comes
in one of three forms. The variations are based on whether the perspective of the
test is that of a reasonable speaker, a reasonable listener, or a ‘neutral’ reasonable
person.”).
14
See Crane, supra note 13, at 1235.
15
See, e.g., United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir.
2011); United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 507–08 (4th Cir. 2012).
16
Compare, e.g., Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1118 (interpreting Black as
requiring that the “speaker subjectively intend the speech as a threat”), with White,
670 F.3d at 507–08 (requiring only that the speaker intend to communicate a
statement that meets the objective test for true threats).
17
See infra Section II.B.
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Many lawyers and commentators18 expected the Supreme Court
to resolve the circuit court split as to this mens rea issue in the 2015
case of Elonis v. United States, but the Court ultimately decided the
case on statutory grounds.19 The eventual resolution of this question
will have a significant effect on domestic violence victims because
of the frequency with which they endure perpetrators’ threats and
the devastating emotional and financial toll that such threats exact.20
The Supreme Court specifically noted the importance of true threat
jurisprudence for domestic violence victims during oral argument in
Elonis.21 For example, Justice Alito asked Elonis’s attorney, “What
do you say to the amici who say that if [a subjective knowledge or
purpose to threaten standard] is adopted, this is going to have a very
grave effect in cases of domestic violence?”22 Commentators agree
that the Supreme Court will likely feel compelled to revisit the
constitutional question left unaddressed in Elonis as the Internet

18

See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Do Online Death Threats Count as Free Speech?,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/30/magazine/doonline-death-threats-count-as-free-speech.html; Clay Calvert et al., Opinion, Rap
Lyrics or True Threats? It’s Time for the High Court to Decide, FORBES (May 24,
2014, 12:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/05/24/rap-lyricsor-true-threats-its-time-for-the-high-court-to-decide/#1e2a42525601;
Justices
Weigh
Limits
of
Free
Speech
Over
Internet,
FOX NEWS,
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/justices-weigh-limits-of-free-speech-overinternet (last updated Dec. 20, 2015); Vauhini Vara, The Nuances of Threats on
Facebook,
NEW
YORKER
(Dec.
3,
2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/nuances-threat-facebook.
19
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015).
20
See infra Parts II, IV.
21
Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001
(2015) (No. 13-983) [hereinafter Elonis Oral Argument] (statement of Justice
Breyer expressing his concern that “a lot of [true threat] cases would come up in
the context of domestic relations disputes”). The Court also accepted two amicus
briefs from attorneys and service providers on behalf of domestic violence
victims. See Brief Amici Curiae the National Network to End Domestic Violence,
et al. in Support of Respondent, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)
(No. 13-983) [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae the National Network to End
Domestic Violence, et al.]; Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment
and Appeals Project and Professor Margaret Drew as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983)
[hereinafter Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals
Project and Professor Margaret Drew as Amici Curiae].
22
Elonis Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 60.
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renders criminal charges for threats more common.23 The Court will
not lack opportunities to decide the proper test for a true threat—
cases raising this question continue to be litigated, with unsuccessful
defendants regularly seeking certiorari.24
Legal scholarship has rarely examined the resolution of the
circuit court split on true threats from the perspective of a domestic
violence victim.25 Of those domestic violence victims advocates that
have addressed this issue, some have argued that victims’ interests
are best served if minimal First Amendment protection, namely
requiring only the intent to communicate objectively threatening
words, applies to all true threats cases, whether civil or criminal.26
Victim advocates correctly note that adoption of a subjective intent
to threaten requirement for true threats could limit access of many
victims to civil protection orders, as civil protective order standards
in some states rely upon criminal statutes or caselaw.27 A heightened
mens rea requirement would also hinder the ability of some victims
to seek criminal prosecution of their former intimate partners for
abuse.28
23
See e.g., Cameron L. Fields, Note, Unraveling a Ball of Confusion: Layers
of Criminal Intent, Facebook, Rap, and Uncertainty in Elonis v. United States,
135 S. CT. 2001 (2015), 36 MISS. COLLEGE L. REV. 133, 169 (2017) (discussing
how Elonis failed to answer many questions about true threat analysis); Fernando
L. Diaz, Note, Trolling & the First Amendment: Protecting Internet Speech in the
Era of Cyberbullies & Internet Defamation, 2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 135,
138 (2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court will be petitioned to hear more cases like U.S.
v. Elonis, where Internet speech challenges traditional First Amendment
jurisprudence.”).
24
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Knox v. Pennsylvania, 190 A.3d
1146 (Pa. 2018) (No. 18-949), denying cert. 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019) [hereinafter
Knox Writ of Cert.]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, State v. Sibley, No. 1 CA-CR
17-0768, 2018 WL 2440236 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 31, 2018) (No. 18-1001),
denying cert. 139 S. Ct. 1348 (2019).
25
But see Bumb, supra note 4, at 950 (“[T]he issue domestic violence victim
advocates need to address is how to establish that [abusers] knew the threatening
nature of [their] posts . . .”).
26
See, e.g., Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals
Project and Professor Margaret Drew as Amici Curiae, supra note 21, at 30–31
(“[A] ruling that the First Amendment requires proof of subjective intent in
prosecutions for domestic abuse threats would jeopardize the protections afforded
victims . . .”); Brief Amici Curiae the National Network to End Domestic
Violence, et al., supra note 21, at 21–22.
27
See infra Section II.B.
28
See infra Section II.C.
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This Article, however, argues that while an interpretation of the
First Amendment requiring a minimal subjective test for true threats
in civil protection order cases is constitutionally sufficient and
comports with the goals of domestic violence victims, the same low
mens rea standard in criminal cases conflicts with the preferences of
many victims. First, many victims disfavor reliance on criminal law
as a means of preventing and remedying harm from domestic
violence.29 Second, a legal rule which enhances the likelihood of
criminal convictions in all true threat cases, including those not
involving domestic violence, contributes to the problem of mass
incarceration, which has had a profoundly negative impact on the
communities in which many domestic violence victims live.30 Third,
vigorous First Amendment protections for political protest speech,
including rhetorical threats of violence, help to safeguard public
expression of social justice outrage on issues of importance to
domestic violence victims.31 In this regard, rap music offers some
helpful insight into free speech concerns with a subjective test
requiring minimal intent.32
This Article provides a legal framework, attuned to the interests
and perspectives of domestic violence victims, aimed at limiting the
frequency of true threats of violence while also respecting freedom
of speech principles and the intersectional identities of domestic
violence victims.33 This Article argues that, rather than imposing a
29

See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.C.
31
See infra Part III.
32
See, e.g., N.W.A., Fuck tha Police, on STRAIGHT OUTTA COMPTON
(Ruthless Records & Priority Records 1988); see also infra Section IV.A.3. Other
scholars have addressed issues of misogyny in rap which, while beyond the scope
of this Article, are nonetheless important to note. See, e.g., Sarah Rogerson, Using
Hip-Hop’s Lyrical Narrative to Inform and Critique the Family Justice System in
HIP HOP AND THE LAW 219, 227 n.2 (Pamela Bridgewater et al., eds. 2015)
(“[G]angsta rap . . . tends to be less articulate regarding contemporary social
issues and more focused on ‘thug’ or ‘gang’ culture of violence, materialism, and
misogyny.”).
33
“Intersectionality is defined as “the interconnected nature of social
categorizations such as race, class, and gender as they apply to a given individual
or group, regarded as creating overlapping and independent systems of
discrimination or disadvantage.” Intersectionality, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2011); see Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 139 (1989).
30
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single, overarching standard to achieve the proper balance between
deterring violent threats and protecting free speech, the Court should
instead draw upon the framework of defamation law to apply
varying mens rea standards to true threats depending upon the
communication target, context of delivery, and type of potential
liability.34 Part I provides an overview of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on true threats and the circumstances in which threats
of violence may receive some level of constitutional protection. Part
II describes the prevalence of threats in the context of domestic
violence, as well as the emotional and financial costs of such threats
for victims. It also highlights the potential for a constitutionally
required, heightened mens rea standard to limit legal relief for
domestic violence victims seeking civil protection orders and details
victims’ diverse viewpoints regarding criminal prosecution of their
current and former intimate partners. Part III explains how an
examination of the Supreme Court’s standards for other unprotected
speech categories, specifically defamation, and, to a lesser extent,
incitement, provides helpful insight into the rules that optimally
balance interests in free speech and protection of victims from the
harm caused by true threats. Part IV suggests that the Supreme Court
adopt a three-tiered approach to the subjective mens rea for true
threats in addition to requiring communication of words qualifying
as true threats pursuant to the objective test. Specifically, the Article
first proposes heightened free speech protection (purpose to threaten
or knowledge to a substantial certainty that a statement will threaten)
for public protest context threats that encompass threats against
public officials or figures on matters of public concern when

34

While this Article focuses on the intersection of true threat jurisprudence
and domestic violence, it should not be read as suggesting support for a domestic
violence exceptionalism approach to true threats. “The anti-violence movement
has long engaged in what has come to be known as ‘domestic violence
exceptionalism’—the idea that policymakers should care more about people
subjected to abuse than other victims or trauma or marginalized groups.” LEIGH
GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BALANCED POLICY
APPROACH TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 129 (2018). Rather, I assert that the
perspective of domestic violence victims should be given significant
consideration particularly in the context of civil liability for true threats which
will involve almost exclusively domestic violence civil protection order cases as
discussed in Section IV.B.2, infra.
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someone utters those threats in public.35 Second, it suggests an
intermediate level of protection (recklessness as to whether a
statement will threaten) in criminal cases for private context threats
which include any threats against private individuals regardless of
whether they are uttered in public or in private, as well as threats
against public officials or figures that are uttered in private.36
Finally, in civil cases, this Article recommends a lesser standard for
private context threats of violence against any individual or group,
requiring only that the speaker intends to communicate the
objectively threatening words without any need for the speaker to
also intend to threaten the target of the statement. 37 This approach
best balances domestic violence victim concerns, providing
significant continued protection to threat victims while also
allowing for impassioned political protest speech.38
The terms “public protest context threats” and “private context threats” are
used throughout this Article as a shorthand for the definitions utilized here.
Although she did not utilize the term “public protest context threats” in this
specific manner, Judge Marsha S. Berzon provided the inspiration for the term in
her employment of similar language in her dissent. See Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1105–
08 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Berzon, J., dissenting).
36
To clarify, I argue that a recklessness standard should apply to any criminal
case involving threats of violence which the speaker communicates privately, (i.e.,
personal cellular telephone voicemail or text message), to a public official or
figure, regardless of whether the speech also addresses a matter of public concern,
for reasons discussed infra Section IV.B. Private individual is used here to refer
to anyone not qualifying as a public official or figure.
37
Civil cases involving true threats will almost all involve domestic violence
civil protection orders but will also include, in some jurisdictions, other civil stay
away orders, for victims of non-intimate partner abuse, as well as negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
38
Two other jurists have suggested that true threat standards should draw
upon Supreme Court precedent on defamation, albeit in different ways than
proposed in this Article. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette,
Inc., 244 F.3d at 1107 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (suggesting that for true threats
against public officials or public figures and on matters of public concern, the
court should require subjective intent on the part of the speaker along with an
objective test that specific victims understand communication as an unequivocal
threat that the speaker would physically harm them but not addressing other types
of true threats); Michael Pierce, Prosecuting Online Threats After Elonis, 110 NW.
U. L. REV. ONLINE 51, 59 (2015) (arguing for a recklessness standard for online
threats against public figures or on public issues versus a negligence standard for
threats involving private individuals).
35
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DEVELOPMENT OF TRUE THREAT JURISPRUDENCE

A. Unprotected Speech
The First Amendment dictates that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”39 Jurists have discussed
and debated the importance of various rationales underlying the
Constitution’s protection of speech, including the promotion of selfgovernment, support for autonomy, facilitation of the search for
truth, and provision of a safety-value for unlawful impulses.40 The
Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the key role of respect
for political speech in First Amendment interpretation, describing
the First Amendment’s focus as protection of “the free discussion of
governmental affairs.”41 Moreover, the government cannot prohibit
speech or expressive conduct merely because society finds it
“offensive or disagreeable,”42 or because people find it to be
“hurtful.”43

39

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (noting the marketplace of ideas rationale for First Amendment
protection and stating “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas . . . the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market . . .”); Anne Klinefelter, First Amendment Limits on
Library Collection Management, 102 L. LIBR. J. 343, 347 (2010) (noting goals
underlying the First Amendment include “citizen oversight of government”); C.
Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964, 1001 (1978) (observing that the rationale for protecting speech draws
from “ethical requirement that the integrity and autonomy of the individual moral
agent must be respected”); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in
the First Amendment, 43 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 20, 23 n.18 (1975) (“[T]he first
amendment serves chiefly as a safety valve, permitting peaceful reform within a
stable system-or, . . . preventing revolution through ‘repressive tolerance.’”).
41
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); see also infra Section IV.A.I.
42
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“if there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”).
43
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.
515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995) (“Its point is simply the point of all speech protection,
which is to shield just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are
misguided, or even hurtful.”).
40
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However, free speech rights are not “absolute at all times and
under all circumstances.”44 The Supreme Court first announced that
some categories of speech did not warrant constitutional protection
in the 1942 case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.45 In that case,
Walter Chaplinsky appealed his conviction for violation of a state
criminal law banning the use of “offensive, derisive or annoying”
words addressed towards another in public on First Amendment
grounds.46 The Supreme Court upheld Chaplinsky’s conviction and,
in explaining its ruling, acknowledged the existence of “certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.”47 Unprotected speech categories include
libel and obscenity as well as “fighting words,” which the Court in
Chaplinsky defined as “words likely to cause an average addressee
to fight.”48 Libel, obscenity, and fighting words do not merit
constitutional protection because “such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them may
be outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”49
The Supreme Court first declared that true threats were among
the categories of unprotected speech in the 1969 case of Watts v.
United States.50 In 1966, Robert Watts, an African-American
teenager,51 attended a public rally on the Washington Monument

44

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“[I]t is well
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances.”).
45
Id. at 572.
46
Id. at 569.
47
Id. at 571–72.
48
Id. at 572–73 (“These [categories of unprotected speech] include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words . . .”).
49
Id. at 572; see also Ohralick v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978) (Commercial speech also receives less constitutional protection given its
“subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.”).
50
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
51
David L. Hudson Jr., 50 Years Ago, the Court Enters the True Threats
Thicket in Watts v. United States, FREEDOM FORUM INST. (May 7, 2019),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2019/05/07/50-years-ago-the-courtenters-the-true-threats-thicket-in-watts-v-united-states/.
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grounds.52 Watts spoke out during a post-rally discussion stating “I
have already received my draft classification as 1-A” then declared
he would not go to Vietnam explaining that the government was
“not going to make [him] kill [his] black brothers.”53 Watts closed
out his comments with the rhetorical flourish that resulted in his
criminal charges: “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I
want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”54 The group in attendance laughed
and the discussion ended uneventfully.55 However, the next day,
Secret Service agents arrested Watts, and prosecutors charged him
with a felony violation of a federal law banning any “knowing and
willful” threat to injure or kill the President.56
A jury convicted Watts and the Court of Appeals affirmed; the
Supreme Court, however, reversed.57 The Supreme Court found
Watts’ remark to be “political hyperbole” and reiterated America’s
“profound national commitment” to vigorous debate on public
issues.58 Watts’s statement consisted of merely a “crude offensive
method of stating a political opposition to the President.”59 In the
per curiam opinion, the Court further noted that language in the
political arena is “often vituperative, abusive and inexact.”60 In
reaching the conclusion that Watts’s rhetoric did not constitute a true
threat, the Court considered the context of Watts’s statement as well
as the statement’s conditional nature and the reaction of the
listeners.61 The Supreme Court did not, however, offer any detailed
analysis or define the term “true threat.”62
The Supreme Court did not return to the issue of true threats until
2003 in Virginia v. Black.63 In Black, Justice O’Connor focused on
52

Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Skelly Wright,
J., dissenting) (“Appellant attended a rally of the W.E.B. DuBois Club at the
Sylvan Theater on the Washington Monument grounds.”).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
56
Watts, 402 F.2d at 677; see also 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1964).
57
Watts, 394 U.S. at 706.
58
Id. at 708.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
See id. (mentioning “true threat” once, but not defining or analyzing the
term).
63
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (plurality opinion).
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the concept of true threats in just two paragraphs of a lengthy
plurality opinion.64 The Court ultimately resolved the case on other
grounds.65 Specifically, the Black Court found a Virginia statute
criminalizing cross burning with intent to intimidate was
unconstitutional due to a provision which, as interpreted in a jury
instruction, improperly treated an act of cross burning alone as
prima facie evidence of the requisite criminal intent.66 The Court
noted, however, that the state of Virginia did possess the power to
ban cross burning “with intent to intimidate” because that type of
symbolic speech constituted a true threat.67 The plurality then
offered that “‘[t]rue threats’ encompass those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an unlawful act of violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals.”68
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s limited attention to the issue,
the circuit courts have decided numerous cases involving true
threats in the years before and after Black.69 Lower courts have
found that analyzing whether a statement qualifies as a true threat
requires two distinct inquiries. First, the fact finder must consider
whether the words in question are objectively threatening such that
the speech may fail to warrant constitutional protection.70 With
respect to this first question, the circuit courts have defined the
concept of a true threat in similar ways, largely corresponding to the
language in Black.71 The circuit courts frequently refer to this
64

Id. at 359–60.
Id. at 347–48.
66
Id. at 347–48, 354, 364–65 (holding that the prima facie evidence provision
of the statute was improper because cross burning might indicate an intent to
intimidate or it might suggest a “person is engaged in core political speech” in an
effort to “communicate . . . shared ideology”).
67
Id. at 362.
68
Id. at 359.
69
See infra notes 72–74.
70
See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 720, F.3d 411, 426–27 (2d Cir. 2013)
(affirming lower court jury instructions that instructed that “[w]hether a particular
statement is a threat is governed by an objective standard.”).
71
See e.g., United States v. Doggart, 906 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2018) (“an
expression of an intent to inflict loss or harm”); United States v. White, 810 F.3d
212, 220 (4th Cir. 2016) (“serious expression of an intent to do harm”); United
States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 972 (10th Cir. 2014) (“declaration of intention,
purpose, design, goal, or determination to inflict [bodily injury] on another”
65
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inquiry as the “objective test” for a true threat because they have
adopted the viewpoint of either a reasonable speaker, reasonable
recipient/listener, or just a generic reasonable person to assess
whether the words at issue may constitute a true threat. 72 The
“objective test” generally looks to the words spoken, as well as to a

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Turner, 720 F.3d at 427 (“serious expression
of an intent to inflict injury”); United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir.
2013) (“communications expressing an intent to inflict injury in the present or
future”); United States v. Stefanik, 674 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2012) (“serious
expression of intent to inflict bodily injury” (internal quotation marks omitted));
United States v. Jongewaard, 567 F.3d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 2009) (“express[ion of]
an intention to inflict harm, loss, evil, injury, or damage on another”); United
States v. Stewart, 411 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 2005) (“serious expression of an
intention to inflict bodily harm” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States
v. Alaboud, 347 F.3d 1293, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2003) (“serious expression of an
intention to inflict bodily harm” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Planned
Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d
1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“expression of an intention to inflict evil,
injury, or damage on another” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States
v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 2001) (communication that “create[s]
apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
72
Compare, e.g., United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013)
(“this court has applied an objective defendant vantage point standard”); United
States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 331 n.7 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The Fourth Circuit test
focuses on the reasonable recipient, but our test asks whether a reasonable speaker
would foresee that statement would be understood as a threat.”), with Turner, 720
F.3d at 420 (“This Circuit’s test for whether conduct amounts to a true threat is
an objective one—namely, whether an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is
familiar with the context of the [communication] would interpret it as a threat of
inquiry.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. White, 670
F.3d 498, 509 (4th Cir. 2012) (“whether the statement amounts to a true threat is
determined by the understanding of a reasonable recipient familiar with the
context”); Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (“Our court is in the camp that views the nature of the alleged
threat from the viewpoint of a reasonable recipient.”), and Porter v. Ascension
Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Speech is a ‘true threat’ and
therefore unprotected if an objectively reasonable person would interpret the
speech as a ‘serious expression of an intent to cause a present or future
harm.’”); United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 2012) (“a
reasonable observer would construe as a true threat to another.”); United States
v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981, 988 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A true threat is determined from
the position of an objective, reasonable person”), vacated by 135 S. Ct. 2798
(2015).
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variety of contextual factors to determine if a statement qualifies as
a true threat.73
With respect to the second, subjective inquiry, the fact finder
must assess whether the speaker of the words at issue had the
necessary intent to utter or publish a true threat pursuant to the
relevant statute, or pursuant to the First Amendment if the
Amendment requires a higher mens rea than the statute.74 On this
mens rea question, the majority of circuit courts have held that the
Constitution requires only that a speaker intend to communicate
particular words—words that the fact finder later determines qualify
objectively as a true threat; under this standard, the speaker need not
intend to threaten or intimidate the victim(s) by speaking the
words.75 Thus, most circuit courts utilize a mens rea standard which,
in essence, protects only a very small subset of defendants who
communicate an objective true threat;76 for example, those who
73

See, e.g., United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000)
(stating that courts must evaluate alleged threat in light of “entire factual context”
considering factors including the reaction of the recipient and other listeners to
the threat and whether the recipient had reason to believe that the speaker had the
propensity to engage in violence). The objective test does not require a speaker
have the purpose of acting upon the threat. See United States v. Magleby, 420
F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360
(2003)) (emphasizing that a finding of the speaker’s actual intent to carry out the
threat is unnecessary because the intent to threaten alone qualifies the speech as a
true threat if the statement also met the standard of the objective test).
74
The existence of a constitutional question regarding the level of intent on
the part of the speaker of a true threat required by the First Amendment depends
in each case upon the mens rea indicated in the applicable federal or state law.
For example, if the relevant law requires only recklessness on the part of the
speaker, defendants may argue that the First Amendment necessitates a higher
mens rea for liability on the basis of speech. See, e.g., Doggart, 906 F.3d at 512;
White, 810 F.3d at 220–21; United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 973 (10th
Cir. 2014); Turner, 720 F.3d at 426–27; Stock, 728 F.3d at 293–94; Jongewaard,
567 F.3d at 341; Stewart, 411 F.3d at 828.
75
See, e.g., White, 670 F.3d at 511 (requiring only intent to communicate the
purported true threat, regardless of subjective intent to intimidate). See also
Clemens, 738 F.3d at 11–12 (summarizing which circuits have considered a
adopting a subjective intent to threaten requirement after Black and finding that
the majority of circuits have rejected such a test and instead continued to require
only a subjective intent to communicate a true threat).
76
See, e.g., Thomas DeBauche, Note, Bursting Bottles: Doubting the
Objective-Only Approach to 18 U.S.C. § 875(C) in Light of United States v.
Jeffries and the Norms of Online Social Networking, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 981, 987,
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deliver a sealed envelope with a true threat from a third party to the
victim while unaware of its contents or those who have Tourette’s
Syndrome. Some commentators and litigants have argued that the
objective test without a corresponding subjective intent to threaten
requirement imposes a standard akin to negligence for true threats.77
However, the mens rea approach followed by the majority of circuit
courts is more fairly characterized as a general intent standard for
true threats.78
Two circuits, however, have cited Black in support of finding
that the First Amendment requires proof of a subjective intent to
threaten, meaning this mens rea standard is far more demanding
than the requirement of a subjective intent to communicate words
that are objectively true threats of violence.79 The Ninth and Tenth
Circuits have held that the First Amendment requires a speaker to
have a subjective intent (purpose or knowledge to a substantial
certainty) to threaten the target of a communication, with words that
the fact finder later determines meet the objective test for a true
1011 n.246 (2014); Brian Walsh, Comment, Circuits Split as to Statutory
Interpretation of the Mens Rea Requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2): The Tenth
Circuit Provides the Correct Answer, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 123, 126–32 (2010).
77
See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 3–4, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
2001 (2015) (No. 13-983). Some courts and commentators discussing the mens
rea inquiry refer to any requirement of an intent to threaten, as opposed to an
intent merely to communicate words determined to be threatening, as the
“subjective test.” See, e.g., Clemens, 738 F.3d at 10–12 (describing the circuit
split as one over objective and subjective intent); Turner, 720 F.3d at 420 n.4
(framing the circuit split in the same terms); United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d
758, 769 (6th Cir. 2011) (framing the circuit split in the same terms); see also
Crane, supra note 13, at 1261–69 (describing different courts’ intent tests for true
threats). However, this narrow use of the term “subjective test” may be misleading
as it fails to acknowledge that, even in the absence of a requirement to prove a
subjective intent to threaten, prosecutors must prove a subjective intent to
communicate a true threat for conviction and cannot simply ignore the question
of a defendant’s subjective intent after proving the defendant uttered a true threat
meeting the objective test.
78
General intent here is used in this Article to refer to an awareness of the
factors that constitute the offense which thus encompasses purpose, knowledge,
or recklessness.
79
See Heineman, 767 F.3d at 978 (holding that true threats require both
objectively threatening speech and a subjective intent to intimidate); United States
v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a true threat
must have objectively threatening language and include a subjective intent to
intimidate).
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threat, in order for the speech to be constitutionally unprotected and
for liability to attach.80 While not arising in every true threat case,
mens rea arguments have been articulated in recent years in part as
a result of the advent of the Internet and other technologies (i.e., text
messaging), which lead speakers to argue a lack of subjective intent
to threaten or even to communicate a true threat based on
ambiguities inherent in communication through these media.81
Despite these recent First Amendment arguments in true threat cases
and the continued circuit court split on the requisite intent for a true
threat post-Black, the Supreme Court did not revisit the issue of true
threats for twelve years following Black, until the Elonis case in
2015.82
B. Elonis v. United States
In June 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its muchanticipated opinion in the case of Elonis v. United States.83 The case
arose when Anthony Douglas Elonis, a man upset following his
separation from his wife, started posting seemingly threatening rap
lyrics on his Facebook page.84 Elonis claimed to be an aspiring rap
artist and his lyrics appeared to threaten to kill his estranged wife as
well as his former co-workers.85 In response to a posting in which
Elonis discussed the best place from which to fire a mortar at his
wife’s house, Elonis’s wife petitioned for relief pursuant to
Pennsylvania’s civil protection order statute and obtained a

80

Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1122; see also United States v. Magleby, 420
F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that “the threat must be made ‘with the
intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.’”). In addition, the
Seventh Circuit indicated in dicta post-Black that it might also adopt a subjective
test in an appropriate case. See United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 499–500
(7th Cir. 2008).
81
See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 386 (5th Cir. 2015)
(en banc) (student who purportedly threatened coaches argued he put “the
recording on Facebook and YouTube . . . to ‘increase awareness of the situation’;
and . . . did not think the coaches would hear the recording and did not intend it
to be a threat . . . “).
82
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Elonis v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004 (2015).
83
See generally Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
84
Id. at 2004–05.
85
Id. at 2007.
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Protection From Abuse Order (“PFA”) against him.86 After the entry
of the PFA, Elonis posted a rap referencing use of explosives to
“take care” of the state police, along with the following lyrics, which
his wife viewed as a threat:
Fold up your PFA and put it in your pocket
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?87
Elonis then moved on to rapping about a school shooting with
the following post on his Facebook page:
That’s it, I’ve had about enough
I’m checking out and making a name for myself
Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius
to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever
imagined
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in
a Kindergarten class
The only question is . . . which one?88
The Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI” or “Bureau”) had
been monitoring Elonis’s Facebook page following contact from his
former employer.89 After the school shooting post, the FBI sent two
agents to speak with Elonis; his next Facebook post ostensibly
threatened to kill the lead FBI agent.90 Federal prosecutors thereafter
charged Elonis with five counts of violating a federal law
prohibiting the transmission in interstate commerce of a threat to
86
87
88
89
90

Id.

Id. at 2006.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Elonis’s post stated, in relevant part:
Little Agent lady stood so close
Took all the strength I had not to turn the b**** ghost . . .
So the next time you knock, you best be serving a warrant
And bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives expert while you’re at
it . . . .
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injure the person of another.91 At the conclusion of the trial, the
district court instructed the jury that speech qualifies as a true threat
under the following circumstances:
a defendant intentionally makes a statement in a
context . . . wherein a reasonable person would
foresee that the statement would be interpreted by
those to whom the maker communicates the
statement as a serious expression of an intention to
inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.92
Elonis’s conviction was affirmed by the Third Circuit.93 Elonis’s
Petition for Writ of Certiorari argued that the jury instruction failed
to reflect the mens rea required by the First Amendment for a true
threat.94
Jurists and media commentators had speculated extensively on
the direction the Court would take in true threat jurisprudence in
Elonis.95 The Court’s ultimate decision in Elonis did not resolve the
circuit court split with respect to the mens rea constitutionally
required for speech to be a true threat.96 Instead, the Supreme Court
reversed Elonis’s conviction and remanded the case based solely on
a statutory issue involving congressional intent with respect to the
requisite mens rea in the applicable federal law.97 The Court stated
91

Id. Specifically, the government charged Elonis for his threats against his
estranged wife, the patrons and employees of his former employer, police officers,
a kindergarten class, and the FBI agent who interviewed him. Id.
92
United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2013).
93
Id. at 335.
94
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 28–32, Elonis v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 2001 (2015), No. 13-983.
95
See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court To Weigh Facebook Threats,
Religious Freedom, Discrimination, NPR (October 6, 2014, 4:58 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2014/10/06/353515078/supreme-court-to-weigh-facebookthreats-religious-freedom-discrimination (discussing Elonis v. United States from
3:12 to 5:12); Vauhini Vara, The Nuances of Threats on Facebook, NEW YORKER
(December 3, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/nuancesthreat-facebook.
96
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013 (2015).
97
Id. at 2008–09, 2012 (“The most we can conclude from the language of
Section 875(e) and its neighboring provisions is that Congress meant to proscribe
a broad class of threats in Section 875(e), but did not identify what mental state,
if any, a defendant must have to be convicted.”).
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“[g]iven our disposition, it is not necessary to consider any First
Amendment issues.”98
Justice Alito wrote a separate opinion concurring in the
judgment but dissenting in part on grounds related to true threat
jurisprudence.99 In his partial dissent, Justice Alito argued that the
majority should have also resolved the question of the requisite mens
rea for finding a true threat to be constitutionally unprotected
speech.100 Justice Alito offered his view that the First Amendment
did not protect true threats uttered recklessly by a speaker because
those threats “inflict great harm and have little if any social
value.”101 He also expressed concern regarding the impact of
requiring knowledge or purpose for a true threat in domestic
violence cases, noting that domestic violence perpetrators consider
threats a weapon of choice.102 In regard to Elonis’s claim that the
First Amendment protected his rap lyrics, including any threats,
Alito stated that a “fig leaf of artistic expression cannot convert such
hurtful, valueless threats into protected speech.”103
Since the Court decided Elonis, many circuit courts have cited
the case but most of these decisions have involved interpretation of
the mens rea required by the same federal criminal statute at issue
in Elonis and have not considered broader constitutional issues.104
98

Id. at 2012.
Id. at 2013–14, 2017 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(concurring that Elonis’ conviction must be vacated and the case remanded in
light of the lower court’s interpretation of the federal criminal statute as requiring
only negligence on the part of a defendant).
100
Id. at 2013, 2016.
101
Id. at 2016. Justice Alito did not address whether the Constitution would
permit the finding of a true threat based on the lower standard of an intent to
communicate a true threat currently employed by the majority of circuit courts.
See id. at 2013–18.
102
Id. at 2017 (citing Brief Amici Curiae the National Network to End
Domestic Violence, et al., supra note 21, at 4–16).
103
Id. at 2016–17. Alito also rejected Elonis’s “support for autonomy” style
argument that his speech should be protected because he made the threats to help
himself deal with the pain in his life. Id. “[T]he fact that making a threat may have
a therapeutic or cathartic effect for the speaker is not sufficient to justify
constitutional protection.” Id. at 2016.
104
See, e.g., United States v. Hoff, 767 F. App’x 614, 621–22 (6th Cir. 2019)
(reviewing only for clear error of true threat jurisprudence); Voneida v. Att’y Gen.
Pa., 738 F. App’x 735, 738–39 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (remanding on
jurisdictional grounds without deciding requisite mens rea); United States v.
99

2020]

STRAIGHT OUTTA SCOTUS

733

Likewise, in state courts, decisions citing Elonis tend to find the case
not applicable or reference it when rejecting arguments made by
defendants seeking First Amendment protection for their statements
that qualified as threats pursuant to state criminal statutes.105 In sum,
federal and state courts have not substantially shifted their preElonis positions on the question of whether the First Amendment
requires merely an intent to communicate a statement objectively
qualifying as a true threat for the speech to lose constitutional
protection or whether it demands some level of intent to threaten to
be considered a true threat. Resolution of the circuit court split
seems likely to bring the issue to the Supreme Court’s attention
again.
II.
TRUE THREATS IN THE CONTEXT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A significant number of true threat cases involve domestic
violence and thus consideration of the concerns of domestic
violence victims will be important in the Supreme Court’s future
resolution of the question of the constitutionally required mens rea
for true threats.106 In the United States, “more than one in three
women . . . have experienced rape, physical violence, and/or

Jordan, 639 F. App’x 768, 769 (2d Cir. 2016) (reviewing only for plain error);
United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 228 (4th Cir. 2016) (affirming conviction
because evidence sufficient to prove any requisite mens rea); United States v.
Dutcher, 851 F.3d 757, 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2017) (affirming conviction because
jury instructions properly instructed on the requisite mens reas pursuant to the
relevant federal statute).
105
See, e.g., State v. Taupier, 193 A.3d 1, 12 (Conn. 2018) (referencing
concurrence of Justice Alito in Elonis, as well as Black, in rejecting defendant’s
assertion that First Amendment requires proof of specific intent to terrorize a
threat target for criminal conviction); Major v. State, 800 S.E.2d 348, 352 (Ga.
2017) (citing Elonis and Black in rejecting argument by defendant that
“communicating a threat of violence in a reckless manner does not meet the
definition of a true threat.”); People v. Lewis, No. 4-15-0449, 2017 WL 5443163,
at *9 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 3, 2017) (Elonis not applicable because lower court “did
not instruct jury it could find defendant guilty based on his negligence”).
106
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walters, 37 N.E.3d 980 (Mass. 2015)
(concerning defendant who stalked and harassed his ex-fiancé); Perez v. State,
No. 08-00253-CR, 2017 WL 1955338 (Tex. Ct. App. May 11, 2017) (concerning
defendant who stalked and threatened his ex-girlfriend); see also supra note 21.
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stalking by an intimate partner in their lifetimes.”107 Threats
represent a key component of the control tactics by which a
perpetrator of domestic violence attempts to coerce an intimate
partner into acceding to his demands, including staying or
reconciling with him despite abuse.108 According to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, almost twenty percent of women in
the United States report having been threatened with physical harm
by an intimate partner at some point during their lifetime.109
A. Particularized Vulnerabilities
Domestic violence victims are particularly vulnerable to threats
of physical harm or death from their current or former intimate
partners in comparison to other threat victims for a number of
reasons. First, domestic violence victims find threats especially
frightening because, for them, threats of violence “are reliable
predictors of physical violence.”110 Statistics and research on
stalking offer a useful proxy for measuring the impact of threats
because stalking generally involves threats, whether implicit,

107

MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER & SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY
REPORT
2
(2010),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_executive_summary-a.pdf.
108
NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, POWER AND CONTROL
WHEEL
1
(2019),
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/PowerControlwheelNOSHADING.pdf
[hereinafter POWER AND CONTROL WHEEL]; see also Mary P. Brewster, Stalking
by Former Intimates: Verbal Threats and Other Predictors of Physical Violence,
15 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 41, 43 (2000) (noting that most former intimate partners
who stalk seek reunification with, or revenge against, their former partners).
109
SHARON G. SMITH ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2015 DATA
BRIEF
–
UPDATED
RELEASE
21
(2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/2015data-brief508.pdf.
110
Brief Amici Curiae the National Network to End Domestic Violence, et al.,
supra note 21, at 9. In addition, the correlation between stalking and violence
persists in studies of homicide cases with at least seventy-five percent of women
killed by intimate partners having experienced prior stalking by her killer. Andrew
King-Ries, Teens, Technology, and Cyberstalking: The Domestic Violence Wave
of the Future?, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 131, 133 (2011).
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explicit, or both.111 Research on stalking demonstrates that a strong
correlation exists between intimate partner stalking and physical
violence, as eighty-one percent of women who were stalked by a
current or former intimate partner were also physically assaulted by
that partner.112 Stalking by former intimate partners also involves
significantly more threats and intrusive behaviors than stalking by
strangers or acquaintances.113 In addition to an increased risk of
physical violence, intimate partner stalking victims suffer from high
rates of anxiety and depression.114 Research suggests that stalking
by a violent current or former intimate partner causes “greater
psychological distress” than stalking by a non-violent partner or
non-partner.115 A threat in the domestic violence context can be
especially harmful partially because the threat often exacerbates the
effects of prior abuse, which itself tends to have serious chronic
mental health consequences.116 Additionally, the emotional harm
caused by intimate partner threats can extend beyond the distress the
target feels because threats of violence “may cause serious
emotional stress for . . . those who care about [the targeted] person,”

111

Lorraine Sheridan & Karl Roberts, Key Questions to Consider in Stalking
Cases, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 255, 263 (2011) (“Stalkers frequently threaten their
victims, either directly or indirectly.”).
112
Judith M. McFarlane et al., Stalking and Intimate Partner Femicide, 3
HOMICIDE STUDIES 300, 301 (1999) (citing a National Violence Against Women
survey).
113
Lorraine Sheridan & Graham M. Davies, Violence and the Prior VictimStalker Relationship; 11 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 102, 109–11 (2001).
114
TK Logan & Robert Walker, Toward a Deeper Understanding of the
Harms Caused by Partner Stalking, 25 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 440, 447 (2010)
(“Women who were stalked had higher global stress scores . . . compared to the
other two groups.”); see also Mindy B. Mechanic et al., Mental Health
Consequences of Intimate Partner Abuse: A Multidimensional Assessment of
Four Different Forms of Abuse, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 634, 645 (2008)
(describing how the study, controlled for effects of other forms of partner abuse,
demonstrated stalking by current or former intimate partner predicts PTSD
symptoms).
115
TK Logan & Robert Walker, Partner Stalking: Psychological Dominance
or “Business as Usual”?, 10 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 247, 265 (2009).
116
Society for Women’s Health Research, Linking Domestic Violence and
Chronic Disease: An Issue Not in the Headlines, HUFFPOST,
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/linking-domestic-violence_b_5884050
(last
updated Nov. 29, 2014).
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such as the target’s children.117 Moreover, a threat’s emotional toll
will often be amplified for a domestic violence victim’s children
when the person making the threat is their other parent.118
Second, because domestic violence victims experience higher
rates of poverty than the general population, they often have fewer
options to enhance personal safety in response to a threat.119 For
example, moving to a new home or changing jobs or schools to
avoid threatened violence are less likely to be options for domestic
violence victims than for other threat victims.120 Research
demonstrates that stalking exacts significant financial costs from
victims who change their residence or lose time at work.121 The
117
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Laurie S. Kohn, Why Doesn’t She Leave? The
Collision of First Amendment Rights and Effective Court Remedies for Victims of
Domestic Violence, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 45, 56 (2001) [hereinafter Kohn,
Why Doesn’t She Leave?] (highlighting state’s interest in protecting domestic
violence victims and their children from negative consequences of speech by
victim’s current or former intimate partner, including partners disclosure of
immigration status or sexual orientation of the victim).
118
For example, children in domestic violence cases suffer a heightened
emotional toll exacted by the awareness that their father threatened to kill or
physically harm their mother. See Jayne O’Donnell & Mabinty Quarshie, The
Startling Toll on Children Who Witness Domestic Violence Is Just Now Being
Understood, NORTHJERSEY.COM, https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/
health/2019/01/29/domestic-violence-research-children-abuse-mental-healthlearning-aces/2227218002/ (last updated Jan. 31, 2019, 7:03 PM). In addition,
because most children in domestic violence households witness abuse, they will
be able to imagine their father physically harming their mother with a level of
detail that the children of other threat victims cannot. See id. Given the prevalence
of post-traumatic stress disorder among children of domestic violence victims, a
threat may also trigger symptoms including nightmares and panic attacks. See id.
119
GOODMARK, supra note 34, at 36 (“[L]ow income women are
disproportionately represented among people subjected to abuse. As many as twothirds of low-income woman are subject to intimate partner violence. The lower
a woman’s income, the more likely she is to experience intimate partner
violence.”).
120
Id. Even more minor changes, such as leaving work early to evade stalking,
are less likely to be feasible for a domestic violence victim with a low wage
position since such jobs frequently offer little flexibility in work hours. See id. at
37.
121
KATRINA BAUM ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 6–7
(2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ovw/legacy/2012/08/15/bjsstalking-rpt.pdf (noting that stalking leads one in seven victims to move in an
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relationship between poverty and the increased likelihood of
violence is further supported by research that shows that domestic
violence victims with the fewest resources experience the highest
rates of repeat abuse.122
Third, domestic violence victims may feel less comfortable
contacting the police than other threat victims because there is a
history of inadequate law enforcement responses to intimate partner
abuse,123 which is an issue that persists today.124 Moreover, in
immigrant communities, some victims fear deportation for
themselves or their partners.125 These concerns have only increased
attempt to escape further stalking.); Brief Amici Curiae the National Network to
End Domestic Violence, et al., supra note 21, at 10–11 (“More than half of victims
reported losing at least one week of work” as a result of stalking); Bumb, supra
note 4, at 940 (explaining that victims oftentimes have to take off from work to
seek court ordered protection, which also leads to taxpayer dollars being spent to
investigate abuse); Melanie M. Hughes & Lisa D. Brush, The Price of Protection:
A Trajectory Analysis of Civil Remedies for Abuse and Women’s Earnings, 80
AM. SOC. R. 140, 158 (2015) (estimating “that women [seeking civil protection
orders] lose between $312 and $1,018 . . . through the year after petitioning alone,
and additional analyses suggest women are not recouping these losses later.”).
122
Mechanic et al., supra note 114, at 648.
123
See, e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 (D.
Conn. 1984) (“[T]he City has failed to put forward any justification for its
disparate treatment of women.”); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor
Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 47 (1992)
(“The evidence suggests, however, that police are largely indifferent to domestic
violence, and that they attach to it a very low priority.”).
124
See Natalie Schreyer, Too Terrified to Speak Up: Domestic Abuse Victims
Afraid
to
Call
Police,
USA
TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/04/09/too-terrified-speak-updomestic-abuse-victims-afraid-call-police/479855002/ (last updated Apr. 9,
2018, 7:33 AM) (“A 2015 survey by the National Domestic Violence Hotline
found that a quarter of women who had called police to report domestic violence
or sexual assault would not call again in the future.”); PETER C. HARVEY, INDEP.
MONITOR, CONSENT DECREE: INDEPENDENT MONITOR – SECOND-YEAR
REASSESSMENT
9–10
(2018),
https://www.newarkpdmonitor.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/Second-Year-Reassessment_10.12.18.pdf
(issuing
report from independent monitor as part of Consent Decree from United States v.
Newark (Civil Action No. 16-1731), finding that police department still needed to
improve response of law enforcement officers, 911 operators, and police
dispatchers to domestic violence complaints).
125
See Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims
Stay, COLO. LAW., Oct. 1999, at 26; see also Natalie Nanasi, A Fraught Pairing:
Immigrant Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence and Law Enforcement, in THE
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in recent years as immigration policy has changed, causing a
plummet in the number of domestic violence reports to police.126
Calls to law enforcement because of domestic violence may also
lead to other undesirable, and potentially devastating, collateral
consequences in certain cases, including intervention by local child
protective services agencies for alleged child neglect.127 In fact,
police calls to a residence by a victim to stop abuse may also result
in a landlord seeking to evict the victim via local nuisance
ordinances.128
Finally, in the context of criminal or civil domestic violence
cases alleging threats, First Amendment arguments by a defendant
will frequently signal that the threat victim is a former, and not a
current, intimate partner.129 If the victim and defendant remain
romantically involved, the defendant can threaten his partner with
violence directly without creating an online evidentiary trail that
may later be used against him.130 As a result, domestic violence
perpetrators will not often threaten their current intimate partners in
a public Internet space.
POLITICIZATION OF SAFETY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
RESPONSES 202, 207–08 (Jane K. Stoever ed., 2019) (explaining how many noncitizen individuals do not trust the police out of fear of being treated differently
because of their immigration status).
126
See ASIAN-PACIFIC INST. ON GENDER BASED VIOLENCE ET AL.,
IMMIGRANT SURVIVORS FEAR REPORTING VIOLENCE 1–2 (2019),
https://www.tahirih.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Advocate-SurveyFinal.pdf; Cora Engelbrecht, Fewer Immigrants Are Reporting Domestic Abuse.
Police Blame Fear of Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/03/us/immigrants-houston-domesticviolence.html.
127
GOODMARK, supra note 34, at 20.
128
Sarah Swan, Home Rules, 64 DUKE L.J. 823, 849–50 (2015) (“[T]enants,
who have either themselves contacted police or whose neighbors, family
members, or friends did so, have been evicted for violating nuisance ordinances
in connection with their attempts to seek assistance during home violence.”); see
also GOODMARK, supra note 34, at 42 (“One particularly problematic practice is
the use of nuisance property laws against people subjected to abuse. Nuisance
property laws allow police to penalize landlords for their tenants’ behavior . . . .
Landlords often include evictions or the threat of eviction . . . and use those threats
to prevent tenants from continuing to seek assistance from the police.”).
129
See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004–07 (2015).
130
Kohn, Why Doesn’t She Leave?, supra note 117, at 4–7 (recounting stories
of individuals abused and threatened).
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However, when a domestic violence victim has left her intimate
partner, the partner often will no longer be able to communicate
directly with her due to actions she has taken to prevent further
abuse, such as blocking his cellphone number, moving to a
confidential address, etc.131 The most effective way for a domestic
violence perpetrator to convey a threat against his former intimate
partner will often be via the Internet.132 Then, to avoid liability based
on that threat, a defendant may try to claim that he made the online
threat for another audience and/or an innocent purpose (i.e., venting,
artwork, etc.) and not to intimidate the victim.133 In contrast, a direct
threat through a private channel is less likely to leave space for a
constitutional defense.134 In light of research establishing that the
time post-separation is the most dangerous for a victim in terms of
her risk of physical assault and homicide,135 a defendant’s free
speech argument in a domestic violence case (and its general
implication that the parties have separated) has increased
significance. In sum, true threat litigation in the domestic violence
context involves a subset of threat victims who are at a high risk of
danger of actual violence but who also have generally fewer options
Path to Safety: What is a Safety Plan?, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
HOTLINE, https://www.thehotline.org/help/path-to-safety/ (last visited Jan. 10,
2020).
132
See Laura Silverstein, The Double Edged Sword: An Examination of the
Global Positioning System, Enhanced 911, and the Internet and Their
Relationships to the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims and Their Abusers, 13
BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 97, 120–21 (2004) (discussing the ease and non-existent
expense for perpetrators to continue their abuse over the Internet).
133
See, e.g., Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007 (noting defendant argued he was merely
emulating rap music).
134
See Hon. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293,
1310 (1993) (“Whether a particular act or message is . . . entitled to First
Amendment protection turns on context as well as content.”).
135
Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive
Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1089, 1092 (2003) (noting that risk of experiencing violence increases
significantly after separation of intimate partners); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY
THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181867, EXTENT, NATURE, AND
CONSEQUENCES
OF
INTIMATE
PARTNER
VIOLENCE
37
(2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf (finding that “married women
who lived apart from their husbands were nearly four times more likely to report
that their husbands had raped, physically assaulted, and/or stalked them than were
women who lived with their husbands”).
131
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and resources available to protect their safety than other threat
victims.
B. Civil Protection Order Impact of True Threat
Jurisprudence
For domestic violence victims, any changes in true threat
jurisprudence will have the most significant impact on civil
protection orders because victims seek these orders more frequently
than they pursue criminal charges against their former intimate
partners.136 In civil protection order cases, domestic violence
victims overwhelmingly support maximizing access to relief
because victims retain autonomy in setting the litigation goals; in
contrast, victims lack such authority in criminal prosecutions.137
Moreover, because civil cases involving First Amendment
arguments related to true threats will likely be civil protection order
matters, the perspective of domestic violence victims should be
particularly important here.138
Generally, protection orders for domestic violence victims are
civil orders, although violation of a civil protection order constitutes
a crime.139 The essence of a civil protection order is a requirement
that the defendant stay physically away from the victim and have
limited or no other contact with her.140 Civil protection orders may
also provide for ancillary relief, such as child custody and visitation,
child support, and use and possession of a home.141 The civil
136
Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic
Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the
Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1503–04 (2008) (“[C]ivil protection
orders have emerged as the most frequently used . . . legal remedy against
domestic violence.”).
137
Id. at 1508.
138
See generally Kohn, Why Doesn’t She Leave?, supra note 117 (discussing
first amendment issues that abound when judges enjoin speech in civil protection
order, divorce, or child custody proceedings); see infra Section IV.B.2.
139
See Kohn, Why Doesn’t She Leave?, supra note 117, at 10; see also VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.2(A) (West 2016); N.Y. FAM. LAW § 812(1) (McKinney
2019).
140
See Goldfarb, supra note 136, at 1506 (defining civil protection order as “a
court order that imposes legally binding restrictions on an offender’s future
conduct.”).
141
Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly:
Between “The Truly National and the Truly Local,” 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1109
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protection order process involves an initial ex parte filing seeking a
temporary order.142 Within a relatively short time frame, a victim
will need to appear at an adversarial hearing before a judge in order
to obtain a full civil protection order, which may last for a year or
more, depending on the state’s law.143 The general public often
views civil protection orders with an unfair level of skepticism
regarding their efficacy.144 However, research indicates that in many
cases, civil protection orders stop abuse entirely or reduce frequency
and severity of abuse.145 In addition, domestic violence victims
generally view the value of civil protection orders positively.146

(2001); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2018) (authorizing the court
to enter a restraining order to grant ancillary relief and other relief including
restitution, an order requiring the defendant to receive domestic violence
counseling, and possession of personal property including a pet).
142
Goldfarb, supra note 136, at 1506; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(b)
(West 2017) (providing means to file a petition for a domestic violence restraining
order in New Jersey court).
143
See generally A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
CIVIL
PROTECTION
ORDERS
(CPOS)
(2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/domestic_violence
1/Charts/migrated_charts/2016%20CPO%20Availability%20Chart.pdf (listing
domestic violence laws in all U.S. states and territories).
144
See, e.g., Robin L. Barton, Do Orders of Protection Actually Shield
Domestic Violence Victims?, CRIME REPORT (Jan. 23, 2018),
https://thecrimereport.org/2018/01/23/do-orders-of-protection-actually-shieldvictims/ (providing examples of domestic violence victims who had protective
orders against their abuser, who were ultimately killed); Stefanie Knowlton, Are
Restraining
Orders
False
Security?,
USA
TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/07/domestic-violencedeaths-raise-questions-about-gaps/15260841/ (last updated Sept. 7, 2014, 8:18
PM).
145
Victoria L. Holt et al., Civil Protection Orders and Risk of Subsequent
Police-Reported Violence, 288 JAMA 589, 589 (2002) (concluding “[p]ermanent,
but not temporary, protection orders are associated with a significant decrease in
risk of police-reported violence against women by their male intimate partners”).
But see Andrew R. Klein, Re-Abuse in a Population of Court-Restrained Male
Batterers After Two Years: Development of a Predictive Model, in DO ARRESTS
AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 192, 207 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa
eds., 1996) (noting “research does not reveal whether the use of [restraining
orders] lessens the severity of continued abuse or the number of abuse incidents”).
146
Goldfarb, supra note 136, at 1510–12 (citing several studies in which
seventy-two to eighty-four percent of women who had obtained civil protective
orders reported improvements in their safety and well-being).

742

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:711

Any future Supreme Court decision on a constitutionally
requisite mens rea for true threats will likely be in the context of a
criminal case and, thus, will not automatically apply in civil
protection order matters.147 However, even if the Supreme Court
chose to explicitly limit a holding on the subjective test for true
threats to criminal cases, the pronouncement would likely impact
civil protection order matters because “criminal law casts a long
shadow over civil protection order practice.”148 In order for a victim
to receive a civil protection order based on threats, approximately
eighteen states require her to prove the crime of threats.149 Victims
in civil protection order cases alleging threats of violence that do not
qualify as “terroristic threats” or “assault” under state law may, in
some cases, argue that these threats constitute “stalking.”150
147

See infra Section IV.B.2; see also Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal
Empowerment and Appeals Project and Professor Margaret Drew as Amici
Curiae, supra note 21, at 31 (“Should the Court require proof of subjective intent
in true threat prosecutions, Amici respectfully urge the Court to distinguish and
carefully safeguard civil protection orders from its holding.”).
148
Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project
and Professor Margaret Drew as Amici Curiae, supra note 21, at 18, 27 (noting
even in states not utilizing criminal statutes as controlling authority in civil
protection order hearings, judges will be “inevitably influenced by” criminal law
standards when evaluating abuse allegations); see also Ashley Hahn, Comment,
Toward a Uniform Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order Law, 48 SETON
HALL L. REV. 897, 904 (2018) (noting that eleven states require a victim of
domestic violence to prove all elements of one or more criminal offenses
committed against her by the defendant to obtain a civil protection order, and
twenty-one states require proof of a criminal act with respect to some types of
abuse before a court will grant a civil protection order).
149
See Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals
Project and Professor Margaret Drew as Amici Curiae, supra note 21, at 27 (“In
fact, approximately 18 states require litigants to prove the crime of threats in order
to receive a civil protection order based on threats.”).
150
See James Thomas Tucker, Note, Stalking the Problems with Stalking
Laws: The Effectiveness of Florida Statutes Section 784.048, 45 FLA. L. REV. 609,
615 (1993) (noting that anti-stalking statutes “filled the gap” left by state law
definitions of terroristic threats and assault). A domestic violence victim unable
to prove all elements of terroristic threats, assault, or stalking following an
incident of abuse may also seek a civil protection order on the grounds of
harassment. See generally, e.g., A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
STALKING/HARASSMENT CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS (CPOS) BY STATE (2009)
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/ABA_StalkingHarassmentCivilProtectionOrdersByState_6-2009.pdf (listing the relevant
statutes for each state and explaining what is needed to prove stalking versus
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However, as with threats, some states require a victim to establish
that the defendant committed the crime of stalking to receive a civil
protection order on the ground of stalking.151
A comprehensive examination of the potential impact of a
Supreme Court decision on the constitutional mens rea requirement
for true threats on state civil protection order relief would be
challenging in light of the interplay between the civil protection
order statutes and criminal law in many states, as well as the varied
ways in which a threatening statement may qualify as an act of
domestic violence.152
However, a partial analysis of state civil protection order statutes
suggests concerns on behalf of domestic violence victims with
respect to their ability to obtain relief if the Court finds that the First
Amendment requires a heightened mens rea for a true threat are
warranted. While civil protection order statutes in some states
currently rely on definitions of threats that require proof of a purpose
to threaten, other jurisdictions provide relief for a domestic violence
victims able to prove reckless disregard on the part of a former
intimate partner who threatens violence against her.153 Many states
have enacted civil protection order laws that define threats in a
manner that focus on the objectively threatening nature of the
statement to a reasonable person, rather than a speaker’s subjective

harassment in each state, in order to obtain a civil protection order). However,
harassment claims raise additional First Amendment issues beyond the scope of
this Article. See, e.g., Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment
Orders, 64 HASTINGS L. J. 781 (2013).
151
See, e.g., Hahn, supra note 148, at 902, 904–05.
152
In addition, given the limited number of appeals in civil protection order
cases, caselaw interpreting legislative intent on mens rea when the plain language
of statute does not provide clear guidance on that element may not be available.
153
Compare FLA. STAT. § 741.28 (2019) (indicating that to obtain an
injunction for protection on basis of a threat, a victim may attempt to prove the
crime of stalking, as defined by FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (2019), which requires
willful and malicious conduct, or the crime of assault, defined in FLA. STAT.
§ 784.011 (2019), which requires an intentional threat), with N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:25-19 (West 2018) (offering a list of crimes that a petitioner may prove, such
as terroristic threats under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-3 (West 2018), which requires
either purpose to terrorize another or reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing
another). See also Klein & Orloff, supra note 1, at 876 (noting “most statutes
require threatening behavior and criminal intent on the part of the defendant,”
while other statutes require “evidencing a continuity of purpose.”).
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intent to threaten.154 Thus, if the Supreme Court requires a
heightened mens rea—purpose or knowledge to threaten—in order
to prove a true threat in the criminal context, it could “potentially
[ ] undo[ ] years of legislative progress . . . to increase protections
for victims of domestic violence” via civil protection orders.155
Caselaw shows that First Amendment defenses have been raised
frequently in domestic violence proceedings in recent years.156 A
review of reported state court civil and criminal cases involving true
threats and domestic violence indicates a surge in the number of
litigants raising First Amendment arguments in these types of cases
in the last twenty years.157

154

See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203(a)(3) (West 2016) (defining abuse which
may enable a plaintiff to obtain a protective order to include acts which “place a
person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that
person or to another.”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004(1) (West 2017) (to obtain
a protective order, a plaintiff must prove “family violence” such as “a threat that
reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm”); see also Brief
for Amicus Curiae National Center for Victims of Crime in Support of
Respondent United States at 8–9, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)
(No. 13-983) (noting most state stalking laws utilize an objective reasonable
person standard and do not require defendant to have specific intent).
155
Soraya Chemaly & Mary Anne Franks, Supreme Court May Have Made
Online Abuse Easier, TIME (June 3, 2015), https://time.com/3903908/supremecourt-elonis-free-speech/.
156
See e.g., Williams v. Williams, 905 N.W.2d 900, 902, 904 (N.D. 2018)
(reversing entry of restraining order obtained by wife against estranged husband
and remanding for consideration of husband’s claim that entry of order based on
his statements violated his First Amendment rights); Kreuzer v. Kreuzer, 761
N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (“Although Mr. Kreuzer’s picketing activities
might qualify as protected speech in another place at another time, we do not think
they qualify as protected speech on the facts of this case.”); Feinberg v. Butler,
No. 25255, 2004 Haw. App. LEXIS 274, at *1, *18 (Haw. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that an order prohibiting a defendant from “publish[ing] or mak[ing] public of
[sic] any disparaging allegations against [the purported victim] that serve no
legitimate purpose” violated the defendant’s First Amendment rights); Childs v.
Ballou, 148 A.3d 291, 293, 298 (Me. 2016) (determining no error in a case
prohibiting defendant from having any contact with his wife and using the First
Amendment as “a sword to disrupt [the wife’s] life through behavior that . . . met
the definitions of abuse”).
157
A Shepherd’s search for citations to Watts v. United States in state court
cases referencing domestic violence (or related terms) indicates that in the first 40
years following the decision (1970–1999), state courts cited Watts 91times,
whereas in the last 20 years (2000–2019), state courts have cited Watts 209 times.
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Media sources have paid recent attention to free speech issues in
domestic violence proceedings, too.158 In addition, the Internet
provides opportunities for domestic violence perpetrators to share
litigation strategies and find legal information they may utilize in
formulating a free speech defense in civil protection order
proceedings.159 The Court should therefore anticipate that
defendants in civil protection order cases will likely attempt to
invoke any decision favoring increased protection of free speech in
the context of true threats to oppose the issuance of orders against
them.
Finally, the Court should consider that the ability of domestic
violence victims to obtain civil protection orders has implications
for both victim safety and public safety because a civil protection
order will generally prohibit the individual subject to the order from
purchasing or possessing firearms.160 Numerous studies have
established a strong connection between firearm access and
domestic violence homicide.161 However, recognition of the link
between domestic violence and mass shootings has come only in
recent years, with research demonstrating that domestic violence
Presumably, broader access to electronic legal research tools has played a part in
this trend.
158
See, e.g., John S. Eory, Domestic Violence and Free Speech, NAT’L L. REV.
(Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/domestic-violence-andfree-speech; David Coursey, Judge: Apologize on Facebook or Go to Jail,
FORBES
(Feb.
26,
2012,
10:50
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidcoursey/2012/02/26/judge-apologize-onfacebook-or-go-to-jail/#517482c335d9.
159
See,
e.g.,
RESTRAINING
ORDER
BLOG,
https://www.restrainingorderblog.com (last visited Jan. 12, 2019) (blogging about
retaliatory claims to civil protection order proceedings, use of subpoenas, and
related litigation terminology); Should Restraining Orders Be Abolished as
Incompatible with Free Speech Rights, QUORA, (last visited Jan. 12, 2019),
https://www.quora.com/Should-restraining-orders-be-abolished-asincompatible-with-free-speech-rights.
160
GOODMARK, supra note 34, at 72–73. However, laws denying domestic
violence perpetrators access to firearms not always enforced. Id.
161
Campbell et al., supra note 135, at 1092 (stating that the risk of homicide
is five times greater for women whose current or former intimate partners have
access to a gun); see also April Zeoli et al., Risks and Targeted Interventions:
Firearms in Intimate Partner Violence, 38 EPIDEMIOLOGY REV. 125, 125 (2016)
(noting that fifty percent of intimate partner homicide victims die as result of gun
violence).
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and family violence underlie more than half of the mass shootings
perpetrated in the United States during the last decade.162
In sum, any heightened mens rea requirement for true threats in
civil cases has the potential to limit domestic violence victims’
access to protection orders, with negative consequences for both
victim and public safety.
C. Criminal Prosecution and Victim Interests and
Perspectives
Resolution of the First Amendment question left unanswered in
Elonis will impact a broad range of criminal cases, including those
involving domestic violence. Some commentators have expressed
concern that true threat prosecutions pursuant to a low mens rea
requirement may result in the conviction of individuals showing
merely poor judgment, a result which criminal law disfavors.163
Recent arrests and criminal charges, particularly those involving
teenagers for statements on social media posts, suggest fears that the
current approach is overly punitive may be warranted.164 The
162

Mass Shootings in the United States: 2009-2020, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN
SAFETY https://everytownresearch.org/massshootingsreports/mass-shootings-inamerica-2009-2019/ (last updated Feb. 28, 2020). An analysis of mass shootings
in the United States from 2009 to 2018 found 54% of mass shootings to be
domestic violence or family violence related, defined by FBI as the murder of four
or more people, not including the gunman, with one murder victim being a current
or former intimate partner or family member of the shooter. Id.
163
See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and
the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. Rev. 829, 875–76
(2002) (“[A] purely negligence standard . . . is a potentially devastating legal
sword to draw and wield”); Stephanie Charlin, Comment, Clicking the “Like”
Button for Recklessness: How Elonis v. United States Changed True Threats
Analysis, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 705, 720 (2016) (“[N]egligence [is] insufficient
because it [is] ‘inconsistent with ‘the conventional requirement for criminal
conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing . . . .’”) (quoting Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at
2011).
164
Justin Jouvenal, A 12-Year-Old Girl Is Facing Criminal Charges for Using
Certain Emoji. She’s Not Alone., WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2016, 3:47 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2016/02/27/a-12-year-old-girlis-facing-criminal-charges-for-using-emoji-shes-notalone/?utm_term=.a063bb86c329; Austin Sanders, Felony Charges Dropped in
“Facebook Threat” Case, AUSTIN CHRONICLES (Apr. 6, 2018, 11:00 AM),
https://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/news/2018-04-06/felony-chargesdropped-in-facebook-threat-case/; Student Accused of Making Online Threats
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significant consequences for uttering a true threat make it desirable
to avoid wrongful convictions in this area of the law.165 In theory,
problems with true threat statutes being overly punitive could be
addressed, in part, through adjustments in criminal penalties.166
However, significant changes in statutory and common law
standards for threats seem unlikely, and thus, the Court should
establish the constitutional requirements for true threats in light of
current law.
When specifically considering domestic violence cases, victims
have a wide variety of opinions regarding prosecution of their
current or former intimate partners for alleged threats against them,
ranging from enthusiastic to ambivalent to opposed.167 Even after
separating, domestic violence victims may have many reasons for
Directed at Emmerich Manual High School Arrested, CBS 4,
https://cbs4indy.com/2017/01/13/juvenile-accused-of-making-online-threatsdirected-at-emerich-manual-high-school-arrested/ (last updated Jan. 13, 2017,
4:40 PM); Thomas Tracy, Winking Smiley Face: Brooklyn Teen Boy’s Emoji Cop
Threat Charges Tossed by Grand Jury, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 03, 2015, 12:52
PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/grand-jury-tossesbrooklyn-teen-emoji-threat-charges-article-1.2101735 (arguing that concern for
excessive criminalization of online speech should be addressed by reconsidering
the minimum age for criminal responsibility in some jurisdictions and
prosecutorial discretion); see also Perez v. Florida, 137 S. Ct. 853, 853 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring), denying cert. (expressing concern that a defendant
convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in prison may have merely made a
drunken joke).
165
For example, in Elonis all five charged counts of threats were felonies.
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2007–08 (2015); see also Knox Writ of
Cert., supra note 24, at 21 (noting that defendants incarcerated following
convictions for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) “faced an average prison term of
more than two years.”).
166
See Randall Eliason, The Rush to Criminal Remedies, SIDEBARS (Sept. 24,
2019)
https://sidebarsblog.com/when-criminal-remedies-prosecutionappropriate/ (discussing alternatives to criminal sanctions and arguing that
criminal remedies are being used too often).
167
See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s
Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1888 (2002)
(commenting favorably on pro-arrest and pro-prosecution policies which build in
greater flexibility for a victim’s ambivalence “recognizing the complexity of her
situation”); Sara C. Hare, What Do Battered Women Want? Victims’ Opinions on
Prosecution, 21 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 611, 612 (2006) (noting that many victims
who do initially contact law enforcement and request filing of criminal charges
later change their minds and seek to “drop charges”).
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not wishing to see their partners prosecuted, including the need for
child support or the desire to ensure children have visitation with
their fathers.168 Despite this range of viewpoints among victims, the
victims’ advocacy movement in the United States has historically
focused on criminal law responses to combating domestic
violence.169 Meanwhile, some scholars have proposed alternative
approaches, including restorative justice, to address domestic
violence.170 In recent years, more advocates have joined in the
longstanding calls for policy makers to rethink the centrality of
criminalization in the response to domestic violence.171 Thus, it is
undisputed that true threat rules which facilitate high rates of
prosecution for domestic violence would conflict with the goals, and
undermine the autonomy of, at least some victims.172
Domestic violence victims’ interests can also include robust
protections for public dissent. Rhetorical threats of violence can
serve to express outrage on topics of public concern and draw
attention to dissenting political viewpoints but can only do so if the
First Amendment offers strong protection for such speech from
government suppression.173 The battered women’s movement began
168

Niwako Yamawaki et al., Perceptions of Domestic Violence: The Effects
of Domestic Violence Myths, Victim’s Relationship With Her Abuser, and the
Decision to Return to Her Abuser, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3195, 3196–
97 (2012).
169
Mimi E. Kim, The Coupling and Decoupling of Safety and Crime Control,
in THE POLITICIZATION OF SAFETY 15, 15 (Jane K. Stoever ed., 2019); see also
Erika Sussman, Reflections on Police Violence and the Implications for Survivors,
CTR. FOR SURVIVOR AGENCY & JUSTICE (July 13, 2016),
https://csaj.org/news/view/we-are-reeling-after-last-week (explaining that in the
1970s, advocates for battered women sought to address the harm of domestic
violence through “criminal justice remedies, in part to ensure public recognition
of these crimes against women.”).
170
See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, The Justice of Recovery: How the State Can Heal
the Violence of Crime, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 473 (2006); see also Laurie S.
Kohn, What’s So Funny about Peace, Love, and Understanding? Restorative
Justice as a New Paradigm for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL
L. REV. 517, 522–23 (2010).
171
Kim, supra note 169, at 31–32.
172
See Yamawaki et al., supra note 168, at 3198.
173
See, e.g., Sam Sanders, Kathy Griffin: Life After the Trump Severed Head
Controversy,
NPR
(April
23,
2019,
5:09
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/23/716258113/kathy-griffin-life-after-the-trumpsevered-head-controversy. In 2017, comedian Kathy Griffin lost work
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as a protest movement against societal norms which tolerated
domestic violence.174 Today, victim advocates and scholars
continue to seek changes in domestic violence policy, some of
which are controversial.175 Moreover, the intersectional identities of
many domestic violence victims suggests that those advocating on
their behalf should seek change on a broad range of societal issues
beyond intimate partner abuse.176 Domestic violence victims are
disproportionately women from marginalized groups, such as
women of color, immigrants, and LGBTQ individuals.177 A
correlation exists between domestic violence and poverty, as well.178
As a result, effective domestic violence victim advocacy requires
immediately after she posed with a mock-severed head of President Trump and
was placed on the “no-fly” list for two months. Id. “Federal officials also
threatened to charge [Griffin] with conspiracy to assassinate the president.” Id.
174
See Kim, supra note 169, at 17–18.
175
See, e.g., GOODMARK, supra note 34, at 8.
176
See id. at 8–9 (discussing the intersectionality between domestic violence
issues, over-criminalization, and mass incarceration).
177
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COMMUNITIES OF COLOR: FACTS AND STATES
COLLECTION,
WOMEN
OF
COLOR
NETWORK
2–4,
6
(2006)
https://www.doj.state.or.us/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/women_of_color_network_facts_domestic_violence_2
006.pdf (highlighting specific domestic violence issues that affect different
women of color); MIKEL L. WALTERS ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
SURVEY: 2010 FINDINGS ON VICTIMIZATION BY SEXUAL ORIENTATION 1, 18–23
(2013)
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_sofindings.pdf
(studying prevalence of domestic violence behaviors among LGBT individuals in
the United States); SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER
EQUAL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 198 (2016),
http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS%20Full%20Rep
ort%20-%20FINAL%201.6.17.pdf (showing that of the transgender and nonbinary individuals surveyed, “[m]ore than half (54%) experienced some form of
intimate partner violence, including acts involving coercive control and physical
harm.”); The Facts on Immigrant Women and Domestic Violence, FUTURES
WITHOUT
VIOLENCE
https://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/userfiles/file/Children_and_Families/Im
migrant.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2020) (finding that immigrant women often
experience higher rates of domestic violence than U.S. citizens due to more
limited access to legal and social services as well as cultural influences for some
victims).
178
See generally JILL DAVIES, POLICY BLUEPRINT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND
POVERTY
4
(2002),
https://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/materials/files/2016-09/BCS15_BP.pdf.
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work on an array of social justice issues which can impact victims
both directly and indirectly by effecting victims’ families, friends,
and communities (e.g., minimum wage rates, immigration policy,
and police misconduct).179 Mass incarceration represents one such
issue and has had a devastating impact on many of the communities
in which domestic violence victims live and work.180 A low mens
rea for true threats in criminal prosecutions would not only chill
public protest speech, but could also contribute to mass
incarceration, thereby harming the interests of many domestic
violence victims.181
Consideration of the foregoing issues highlights the
complexities of formulating an approach to true threat jurisprudence
that reflects to the greatest possible degree the preferences and
interests of all domestic violence victims in both criminal and civil
cases. In turning to other categories of unprotected speech,
defamation jurisprudence provides support for a nuanced, multitiered approach to the subjective test for true threats which attempts
to optimally promote the goals and needs of domestic violence
victims while also respecting free speech principles.
III.
DEFAMATION OFFERS GUIDANCE ON TRUE THREATS
While the Supreme Court has noted that unprotected speech
categories “can, consistently with the First Amendment, be
regulated,” it has also remarked that these classes of speech are not
See generally, e.g., LAURA HUIZAR & TSEDEYE GEBRESELASSIE, NAT’L
EMP’T L. PROJECT, WHAT A $15 MINIMUM WAGE MEANS FOR WOMEN AND
WORKERS OF COLOR (2016), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/PolicyBrief-15-Minimum-Wage-Women-Workers-of-Color.pdf; Michelle S. Jacobs,
The Violent State: Black Women’s Invisible Struggle Against Police Violence, 24
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 39 (2017); Edna Erez et al., Intersections of
Immigration and Domestic Violence: Voices of Battered Immigrant Women, 4
FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 32 (2009).
180
Campbell Robertson, Crime is Down, Yet U.S. Incarceration Rates are Still
Among the Highest in the World, N.Y. TIMES (April 25, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/us-mass-incarceration-rate.html
(stating that African American men are serving prison sentences at almost six
times the rate of white men and African American women are incarcerated at a
rate double that of White women).
181
See, e.g., Blakey & Murray, supra note 163, at 875–76; Charlin, supra note
163, at 720.
179
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“entirely invisible to the Constitution . . . .”182 The Court has
established definitive legal standards to delineate when speech falls
outside the realm of constitutional protection with respect to some
categories of unprotected speech, but not in regard to others.183 To
the extent that the Supreme Court has announced them, the
constitutional requirements for other categories of unprotected
speech vary, but all reflect the need to balance the potential value of
speech with the injuries speech may cause.184 Since the Supreme
Court has only substantively analyzed the issue of true threats in
Watts and Black, with neither case offering a comprehensive
definition of the term or a rule setting the constitutional boundaries
for threatening speech,185 some scholars have argued that true
threats need their own “fine-tuned test and definition.”186
Other categories of unprotected speech with more robust
definitions and rules, in particular defamation,187 and, to a lesser
extent, incitement,188 may inform future analysis of true threats.
Incitement provides guidance specifically on the optimal rules for
true threats uttered in the public protest context.189 The Court
established the modern rule on incitement in Brandenburg v. Ohio,
in which it determined that the government could not prohibit
speech advocating unlawful violence or other illegal acts unless that
speech was directed to inciting imminent lawless action and likely
182

R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992).
See Wayne Batchis, On the Categorical Approach to Free Speech—And
the Protracted Failure to Delimit the True Treats Exception to the First
Amendment, 37 PACE L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (“contrasting the [Supreme] Court’s
protracted failure to define and delimit true threats with the comparatively robust
guidance it has offered with other [unprotected speech] discrete categories.”).
184
See Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content
Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTS. J. 647, 650–52 (2002) (describing tension between need to protect against
serious injury from speech and need to avoid censorship); see also Erica
Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 689 (2016)
(defining idea of “free speech consequentialism,” where the harms and benefits
of speech are weighed to determine what kinds of speech are constitutionally
protected).
185
See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam);
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
186
See, e.g., Batchis, supra note 183, at 53.
187
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
188
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
189
See id.
183
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to produce that action.190 Advocacy falling short of incitement
deserves First Amendment protection because “the mere abstract
teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a
resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for
violent action.”191 To date, each of the Supreme Court’s cases
addressing incitement has involved public speech intended to
achieve political and social policy goals.192 Some lower courts have
read Brandenburg to require a determination of a specific intent
(purpose) on the part of the speaker to incite immediate unlawful
action before finding speech to be unprotected by the
Constitution,193 but the Supreme Court has not yet confirmed this to
be the correct standard. The Brandenburg Court’s reasoning
suggests that the First Amendment provides protection for some
speech regarding the commission of violent acts for the sake of
promoting discussion on issues of public concern through a
heightened mens rea requirement. As a result, such reasoning could
potentially provide support for utilizing a similar approach with
respect to true threats in the public protest context.
However, with respect to true threats against a private individual
or against any individual uttered in a private setting, even a public
official or figure, incitement does not offer a useful analogy. Private
context threats do not advance the goal of robust public debate that
seems to serve as the primary rationale for requiring specific intent
for regulation of incitement.194 Moreover, an examination of
190

Id. at 448–49.
Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961)).
192
See, e.g., id. at 447 (addressing speech at Ku Klux Klan rally in support of
white supremacy); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982)
(discussing civil rights protest speech in support of boycott against racial
discrimination by local businesses); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561
U.S. 1, 44 (2010) (finding that the giving of aid, including training in peaceful
conflict resolution and political advocacy on behalf of foreign organizations, may
be deemed unlawful assistance of terrorists by the U.S. government).
193
See, e.g., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d
1045, 1063 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Under the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, advocacy may be punished only if it is ‘directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.’ The Government must establish a ‘knowing affiliation’ and a
‘specific intent to further those illegal aims.’”) (internal citations omitted).
194
Cf. Batchis, supra note 183, at 51 (“If the public figure is also a public
official with political duties, it may be even more likely that punishing such
191
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Supreme Court cases on incitement suggests incitement differs from
true threats in several key respects. First, incitement covers a
broader range of activity (i.e., non-violent law breaking) than true
threats and thus this category of speech may merit greater
constitutional protection.195 Second, incitement involves a more
diverse group of potential targets including government institutions
and private companies, in addition to the possible targets of true
threats, namely individuals and groups of individuals.196 This
distinction similarly supports the argument that the Supreme Court
may find the First Amendment to be less concerned with
government regulation of true threats which, by definition, involve
potential physical injury or death to human beings versus
incitement, which may only seek to cause property damage. Finally,
incitement requires a third party hearing the speech to decide to act
in violation of the law to cause injury, whereas the harm from true
threats does not require action by a third party; it requires only that
the target be aware of the threat.197 As a result, true threats will
generally be more likely to cause fear and disruption to individuals
in comparison to incitement. In sum, the Supreme Court’s
incitement jurisprudence lends support to an approach to true threats
that requires a specific intent (purpose or knowledge) in the public
protest context to promote self-government, but these incitement
cases do not offer similar insight into the appropriate standard for
private context threats.
threats will, in some sense, stifle public debate and discussion about important
issues.”).
195
See id. at 36–37 (discussing how the Court defined incitement language
broadly and narrowed the definition of true threats by saying that intimidation is
not part of the definition of true threats).
196
See, e.g., Edward Helmore, ‘How is This Not Inciting Violence?’: Gun
Shop Billboard Targets the Squad, GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/01/gun-shop-billboard-thesquad-aoc-omar-tlaib-pressley (discussing billboard created by a group of
individuals targeting government officials, as possibility being considered
incitement).
197
Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1968) (holding that a
speaker who prepares a group for violent action and steels the group to such
action has committed unlawful incitement), with Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,
359 (2003) (holding that a true threat is a “statement where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual”) (emphasis added).
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The legal standards for defamation offer more extensive
guidance in answering the mens rea question left open in Elonis for
several reasons relating to similarities between defamation and true
threats.198 With both defamation and true threats, the Court seeks to
balance protecting First Amendment rights, especially robust debate
on political issues, with deterring and remedying harm to individuals
caused by speech violating common law norms.199 Threats of
violence and defamatory lies both have the ability to “severely
disrupt peoples’ lives, both by affecting them emotionally . . . and
by impairing their social ties, their professional activities, and their
ability to earn a living.”200 In addition, defamation and true threats
both cause injury as soon as the victim learns of the speech.201 True
threats generally cause the target to experience immediate
198

It has been suggested in at least one scholarly article that rules regarding
obscenity may offer the Supreme Court a useful analogy for true threats because
both true threats and obscenity cause individual and social harm immediately
upon exposure to relevant speech. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2014 Term—
Leading Case: Federal Statutes and Regulations: Federal Threats Statute – Mens
Rea and the First Amendment – Elonis v. United States, 129 HARV. L. REV. 331,
338 (2015). However, the comparison is a weak one, in part because the narrow
definition for true threats contrasts sharply with the notoriously ambiguous
definition of obscenity. Compare Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016
(2015) (“To qualify as a true threat, a communication must be a serious expression
of an intention to commit unlawful physical violence, not merely ‘political
hyperbole’; ‘vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks’; or
‘vituperative, abusive, and inexact’ statements.”), with Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (finding that for something to be deemed obscene, “the trier of
fact must [find]: (a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.”) (internal citations omitted).
199
See e.g., Kohn, Why Doesn’t She Leave?, supra note 117, at 21 n.78
(describing how different courts have balanced First Amendment rights against
state interests in different contexts).
200
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Berzon, J., dissenting).
201
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266–67 (1964) (noting that
common law presumed general damages for defamation). In contrast to true
threats, defamation also causes damage immediately upon publication, assuming
those hearing the defamatory speech find it credible and that their opinion(s)
impact the target. See id.
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“apprehension and disruption, whether the apparent resolve proves
bluster or not,” just as defamation often inflicts demonstrable
reputational injury despite falsity.202 Finally, allegations of both
defamation and true threats may arise in the context of speech on
matters of public concern. Matters of public concern have been
variously defined by the Supreme Court as “subject[s] of legitimate
news interest . . . of general interest and of value and concern to the
public”203 as well as speech “fairly considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.”204
Defamation jurisprudence specifically provides an analytical
framework differentiating between public officials and public
figures versus private individuals, an approach that may also be
useful with true threats.205 At common law, defamation required
proof of negligent publication of a false statement of fact that was
damaging to the plaintiff’s reputation and received no constitutional
protection.206 However, since the 1960s, the Supreme Court’s
decisions have tended to modestly increase constitutional protection
for defamation in particular settings.207 In New York Times v.
Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a public official could not
recover civil damages for defamation relating to official conduct
unless he proved “actual malice” on the part of the speaker by clear
202

Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at 1004
n.3, 1107 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
203
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (quoting City of San Diego v.
Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam)).
204
Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
205
In the First Amendment context, the term “public official” has been utilized
to cover a broad range of government employees. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (“[T]he ‘public official’ designation applies at the
very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or
appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the
conduct of governmental affairs.”). The Supreme Court has likewise established
parameters for qualification of a person as a “public figure.” See, e.g., Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (defining “public figures” to include
individuals who attain status by occupying roles of special prominence in the
affairs of society or thrusting themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies).
206
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 779 F.3d 628, 632–33 (6th Cir. 2015);
Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc., v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 39
F.3d 191, 195 (8th Cir. 1994).
207
See, e.g., Camp v. Yeager, 601 So. 2d 924, 931 (Ala. 1992) (Maddox, J.,
dissenting).
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and convincing evidence.208 The Court defined “actual malice” in
this context as knowledge of the falsity of the defamatory statement
or reckless disregard of its falsity.209 Similarly, in Garrison v.
Louisiana, the Court decided that the First Amendment prohibited
the imposition of criminal libel sanctions for criticism of public
officials in the conduct of their duties in the absence of actual
malice.210
In reaching these decisions, the Court emphasized that “speech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government.”211 Continuation of the common law
negligence rule in this context would have the negative consequence
of self-censorship.212 The Court acknowledged that an “erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected
if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that
they ‘need . . . to survive.’”213 In addition, the Court justified a
heightened mens rea for speech defaming public officials because it
concluded that government employees had, in essence, assumed the
risk of defamation, stating that “public men, are, as it were, public
property.”214
In contrast, the Court refused to extend the New York Times v.
Sullivan actual malice standard to defamatory statements regarding
a private individual, even on a matter of public concern, in Gertz v.
Welch.215 As in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court in Gertz again
justified differential legal treatment of public officials versus private
individuals based on the expectations of those assuming a public
role.216 Specifically, the Court explained the “assumption that public
208

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
Id.
210
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1964). Three years later, the
Supreme Court held in another case that the New York Times rule applied to public
figures, as well as public officials. See Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155
(1967).
211
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74–75.
212
N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279.
213
Id. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
214
Id. at 268 (quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263–64 (1952)).
215
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
216
Id. at 345. The Court also referenced the fact that government officials have
greater access to public channels of communication and thus may more effectively
use counter-speech to remedy reputational harm caused by defamation. Id. at 344–
46.
209
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officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to
increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning
them. No such assumption is justified with respect to a private
individual.”217
At least one jurist has previously suggested the Supreme Court’s
approach to defamation provides useful guidance for true threat
jurisprudence.218 In her dissent in Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists,
Judge Marsha S. Berzon recommended courts look to the Supreme
Court’s defamation jurisprudence with its varied levels of
constitutional speech protection “depending upon the nature of the
speech in question and the role of speech of that nature in the scheme
of the First Amendment” as a model for true threats.219 Thus,
development of defamation jurisprudence from common law rules
allowing negligence standards to a requirement of actual malice in
the context of a public official or public figure for liability may
preview a parallel development in regard to true threats.
IV.
PROPOSED APPROACH
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and
consideration of the concerns of domestic violence victims suggest
that drawing upon the Court’s approaches to defamation and
incitement to create a three-tiered approach for the requisite mens
rea of true threats will best deter threats of violence while also
protecting free speech rights, particularly in the context of public
protest. In determining that a statement qualifies as a true threat and
thus lacks constitutional protection, the Supreme Court should
require that lower courts always first utilize the objective test, which
necessitates a finding that a reasonable person would consider the
speech in question to be a serious threat to commit an act of violence

217

Id. at 345.
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Berzon, J.,
dissenting).
219
Id. at 1104–05 (acknowledging the targeted medical professionals were not
public officials but found the “public nature of the presentation and content
addressing a public issue . . . critical.”).
218
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against a specific individual or group of individuals.220 Then, for
threats meeting the objective test,221 a further subjective test should
apply: courts should assess the speaker’s mens rea to determine if
criminal or civil liability attaches according to a three-tiered
approach. First, in cases of public protest context threats, the
Constitution should be understood to require the purpose to
threaten, or knowledge to a substantial certainty, that the statement
would be understood by a reasonable person to be a true threat, for
criminal or civil liability.222 Second, in criminal prosecutions for
private context threats, on the question of any intent to threaten, a
mens rea of recklessness should be deemed sufficient for conviction
pursuant to the First Amendment.223 Third, in cases in which any
individual seeks civil legal relief in response to a private context
threat, a general intent to communicate a statement qualifying
objectively as a true threat should be adequate, from a constitutional
perspective, to permit entry of a judgment against the speaker.
A. Specific Intent for Public Protest Context Threats
In several ways, Supreme Court free speech precedent suggests
that the Constitution should be interpreted as requiring purpose or
knowledge on the part of a speaker who makes a true threat against
a public official or figure as part of a public protest for liability. First,
the Court has repeatedly and emphatically acknowledged the high
value placed by the Constitution on core political speech.224 A low
mens rea for true threat liability will be more likely to chill public,
politically motivated, rhetorical threats of violence than other types
of true threats. Second, the Court’s caselaw establishes that
220

As discussed in the Introduction, supra, in some jurisdictions, the objective
test focuses on the perspective of a reasonable speaker or a reasonable
listener/recipient rather than a reasonable person. This Article takes no position
on which of these variations of the objective test reflects the proper constitutional
approach and uses reasonable person here for convenience and because it arguably
encompasses both perspectives.
221
See supra Section I.A.
222
As discussed in the Introduction, supra, public protest context threats is a
term used by the author to define threats against public officials or figures in a
public forum and on topics of public concern.
223
As discussed in the Introduction, supra, private context threats are threats
against private individuals or against public officials or figures outside of a public
protest context.
224
See supra Part III; infra Section IV.A.1.
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government officials and public figures assume the risk of harsh
public speech against themselves.225 Finally, an examination of the
respective harms caused by true threats against public officials and
figures versus true threats against private individuals indicates that
threats against the latter will generally cause greater injury.226
1. HIGH VALUE OF SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC PROTEST CONTEXT
As the Court has stated, “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment
is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of
ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”227 In
the United States, we often discuss issues of public concern through
the lens of the person responsible for executing policy on those
issues.228 Reflecting this tendency, a significant number of true
threat prosecutions have involved public criticism of government
officials in which defendants argued their threats served merely as a
rhetorical device to protest the target official’s policy positions.229
In public debates over highly contentious issues, “speakers will
often resort to the language of threats and intimidation to
communicate the depth of [their] feelings about the topic under
discussion.”230 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
United States’ commitment to uninhibited debate on public issues
may result in “vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials.”231 By going “beyond

225
226

See supra Part III and infra Section IV.A.3.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 337 (1974); infra Section

IV.B.
227

Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
Batchis, supra note 183 at 51.
229
See, e.g., Hillstrom v. United States, 760 F. App’x 836, 837 (11th Cir.
2019) (defendant argued he lacked mens rea for a threat conviction based on blog
entry stating “by the end of this year a rouque [sic] [assistant state’s attorney] will
be executed for his abuse of prosecutorial power” and then naming the specific
attorney who would be “first”); see also Batchis, supra note 183, at 51.
230
Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation, and
Free Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1348 (2005).
231
N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citing Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937));
see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (“Strong
and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet
phrases.”); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673–74 (1944) (noting
228
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the bounds of good taste and conventional manners,”232 speech may
provoke an emotional impact that better enables the speaker to
successfully convey a political message.
Historically, recognition of the special value of political speech
lead the Court to pronounce a higher mens rea requirement for
liability for defamation of a public official than the mens rea that is
required to defame a private individual.233 For similar reasons,
public threats of violence against public officials may hold value on
matters of public concern, and thus, may merit additional
constitutional protection that is not warranted in the context of a
privately communicated threat.234 The Supreme Court’s decision in
Virginia v. Black, provides support for the proposed distinction
between threats in a public protest context versus a private
context.235 Specifically, the Black plurality found that the state
statute at issue was unconstitutional because it failed to differentiate
between cross burning as a form of expression for purposes of
conveying political views, which could be protected speech, versus
cross burning for purposes of intimidation, which would qualify as
a true threat and thus be unprotected speech.236
One potential objection to the proposed heightened mens rea for
public protest context threats relates to the fact that the lines of
demarcation between issues of public concern and those of merely
private concern have not been firmly established in the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.237 Thus, the proposed use
of a high mens rea (i.e., purpose or knowledge), for public protest
context threats will likely, in practice, present similar challenges in
determining whether a particular statement involves an issue of
public concern. However, the Supreme Court has recently addressed
that society has a right to criticize public officials even if one “speak[s] foolishly
and without moderation”).
232
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 54.
233
See supra Section III.
234
See Batchis, supra note 183 at 51.
235
See supra Section I.A.
236
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365–66 (2003) (plurality opinion); see
also supra Section I.A.
237
See, e.g., Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 655, 725–26 (2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s “line
drawing efforts in [matters of public concern versus matters of private concern]
have not been reassuring”).
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the distinction between public speech versus private speech and
provided some additional guidance in this area.238 Moreover, lower
courts frequently adjudicate First Amendment cases involving these
distinctions,239 suggesting that the proposed approach to true threats
will be workable.
2. GREATER SUSCEPTIBILITY OF PUBLIC PROTEST SPEECH TO
CHILLING
A minimal mens rea for true threats will likely chill some
political protests that utilize rhetorical threats, via art or otherwise,
whereas it will not likely deter speakers acting with poor judgment.
Defenses to true threat prosecutions based specifically on the
requisite mens rea required by the First Amendment, as opposed to
challenges based on the objective test, tend to manifest in one of
several forms. Some defendants in such actions assert that they were
merely upset and venting frustration, or that they were simply
joking.240 Others argue that the threat constitutes part of a work of
art such as a story, picture, or lyric, and that the Constitution protects
their freedom of expression because they intended to create art and
not to actually threaten anyone.241 Finally, some defend true threat

238

See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2016) (presenting the
issue of the case as whether the speech at issue was of public or private concern
and offering some guiding principles for the public concern test); United States v.
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 720 (2012) (plurality opinion) (differentiating between
fraudulent speech to government employees on official matters, as well as false
representations that one speaks on behalf of the government, and fraudulent
communications in other contexts not implicating such concerns).
239
See, e.g., Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, 697 F.3d 678, 684–86 (8th
Cir. 2012) (applying the Snyder public versus private speech distinction to speech
at a funeral or burial site); Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 611–12 (6th Cir.
2018) (analyzing whether Trump’s direction to have his supporters remove
protestors violated public protest rights under Snyder).
240
See, e.g., Jones v. State, 64 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Ark. 2002) (noting defendant
told purported victim “[d]on’t take this serious” at the time of making the
purported threat).
241
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1168 (Pa. 2018)
(concerning songs); Commonwealth v. Grenga, No. WOCR201401337, 33 Mass.
L. Rep. 94, 95 (Mass. Supp. 2015) (concerning a chalkboard drawing); In re
George T., 93 P.3d 1007, 1011 (Cal. 2004) (concerning poetry).
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prosecutions on the grounds that their threats were rhetorical as part
of a political protest.242
A low mens rea requirement for true threats will be less likely
to chill the speech of those who threaten violence when upset or due
to a miscalculation on what qualifies as funny than it will be to
suppress the speech of political protestors, including artists. While
many protestors extemporize in public speeches, they generally
attempt to articulate their points in a strategic manner to better
achieve their goals. Similarly, artists tend to labor thoughtfully over
their work and, even when creating art quickly or spontaneously,
generally give careful consideration to the distribution of their
work.243 In contrast, irate individuals and ill-advised jokesters do not
generally consider legal consequences.244
Rhetorical threats in the political protest context may also be
more likely to garner the attention of government speech
suppression efforts than threats against private individuals.245 Rap
music provides a valuable lens through which to consider the
chilling effect of a low mens rea standard for true threats on public
protest, since rap musicians have frequently stood at the crossroads
of political dissent in pop culture and true threat prosecutions in
recent years.246 With respect to threats of violence in rap lyrics, some
242

See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902, 928
(1982) (finding the statement “If we catch any of you going in any of them racist
stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck” as an “impassioned plea for black
citizens to unify, to support and respect each other, and to realize the political and
economic power available to them”); Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 827, 832
(9th Cir. 2008) (painting messages such as “I AM A FUCKING SUICIDE
BOMBER COMMUNIST TERRORIST!” and “ALLAH PRAISE THE
PATRIOT ACT . . . FUCKING JIHAD ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT! P.S.
W.O.M.D. ON BOARD!” as a “protest against government policy”).
243
See In re George T., 93 P.3d at 1011 (explaining how the defendant
carefully “labeled [his poems] ‘dark poetry’ to inform readers that they were
exactly that”).
244
See generally, e.g., People v. Eure, 488 N.E.2d 1267, 1271–72, (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986) (explaining that a defendant who acts in the heat of passion, anger, or
fear does not think when they act and cannot be deterred by legal consequences,
such as an armed violence enhancement).
245
See Hustler Magazine, Inc., et. al. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51–52 (1988).
246
See, e.g., People v. Murillo, 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 119, 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)
(reversing trial court’s dismissal of felony threat complaint on grounds that rap
lyrics were protected speech and could not be basis for a conviction where lyrics
lamented a friend’s incarceration and called the friend’s accusers “snitches” and
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threats serve in efforts to convey a broader message advocating for
political or social change.247 In other instances, threats of violence
by rap artists seem to function primarily as a means of selfexpression and/or to garner public attention for commercial
purposes.248 Finally, some rap lyrics threatening violence seem
primarily designed to provoke fear in the target(s) with the artistic
medium of rap perhaps selected, as in the Elonis case,249 to provide
a potential free speech defense in the event of litigation.250
Rap artists have faced arrest, prosecution, and other types of less
formal governmental pressure in response to their use of threats in
songs, including those critical of public officials.251 Perhaps the

threatened to kill them); Lynn Neary, Op-Ed: Two-Year Sentence For Rapper
‘Excessive,’
NPR
(Aug.
10,
2009,
1:00
PM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=111742102.
247
See, e.g., PUBLIC ENEMY, By the Time I Get to Arizona, on APOCALYPSE
91 . . . THE ENEMY STRIKES BLACK (Def Jam Records & Columbia Records 1991)
(rap song ostensibly threatening to kill Arizona’s then Governor Evan Mecham in
response to his cancellation of the state’s holiday honoring Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., with lyrics including “I’m on the one mission to get a politician to honor
/ Or he’s a goner by the time I get to Arizona” and a video depicting violence
against fictional politicians); BODY COUNT, Cop Killer, on BODY COUNT (Sire
Records 1992) (“I’m cop killer, it’s better you than me / Cop killer, fuck police
brutality!”); see also Amici Curiae Brief of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the
Protection of Free Expression et al. in Support of the Petition for A Writ Of
Certiorari at 8, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983)
(explaining how rap evolved with political overtones, as a means through which
people could comment on and challenge the social conditions).
248
See, e.g., EMINEM, Kim, on THE MARSHALL MATHERS LP (Aftermath
Entertainment & Interscope Records 2000) (“Baby you’re so precious, daddy’s so
proud of you / Sit down bitch! You move again I’ll beat the shit out of you!
(Okay).”). In light of the lack of criminal charges or public comment by Eminem’s
former wife Kimberly Ann Scott regarding his numerous songs threatening her
with violence, it seems likely she viewed the songs not as true threats but perhaps
as profit motivated revenge fantasies or, in some instances, descriptions of prior
abuse.
249
See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004–07 (2015).
250
See, e.g., Rios v. Fergusan, 978 A.2d 592, 595 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)
(using rap video on YouTube to threaten a former intimate partner with death).
251
Adam Liptak, Hip-Hop Artists Give the Supreme Court a Primer on Rap
Music,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
6,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/us/politics/supreme-court-rap-music.html;
Veronica Stracqualursi, Killer Mike, Chance the Rapper, Meek Mill to Supreme
Court: Pittsburgh Rapper’s Lyrics Are Not ‘A True Threat of Violence,’ CNN,
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most famous example involves the rap group N.W.A., which
released the song Fuck tha Police in 1988 with lyrics condemning
police brutality against African-Americans and referencing violent
retaliation in what one group member described as a “revenge
fantasy.”252 The Assistant Director of the FBI wrote a letter on
behalf of the Bureau to the president of N.W.A.’s record label
objecting to the song, which he claimed encouraged violence against
police officers.253 In addition, “[a]n informal police network faxe[d]
messages to police stations nationwide, urging officers to help
cancel concerts.”254 These government and quasi-government
actions aimed at suppressing dissent achieved partial success in that
N.W.A.’s promoter insisted that the group not play Fuck tha Police
on tour although, ultimately, Fuck tha Police, along with the album
Straight Outta Compton, had a significant musical and cultural
impact.255
https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/07/politics/supreme-court-first-amendmentrappers/index.html (last updated Mar. 7, 2019, 5:53 PM).
252
Kelley L. Carter, The Painful, Long, and Lasting Legacy of “Fuck tha
Police,”
BUZZFEED
(Aug.
13,
2015,
6:06
PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kelleylcarter/how-fuck-tha-policestarted-a-revolution. N.W.A. is an abbreviation for “Niggaz Wit Attitudes.”
Danielle Harling, Ice Cube Names “Things N.W.A. Does Not Stand For” With
Jimmy
Fallon,
HIPHOPDX
(AUG.
6,
2015,
7:30
AM),
https://hiphopdx.com/news/id.34972/title.ice-cube-names-things-n-w-a-doesnot-stand-for-with-jimmy-fallon.
253
When Christian America and the Cops Went Insane Over N.W.A, Rap, and
Metal,
VILLAGE
VOICE
(Aug.
20,
2015),
https://www.villagevoice.com/2015/08/20/when-christian-america-and-thecops-went-insane-over-n-w-a-rap-and-metal/.
254
Id. These efforts to inspire cancellation of N.W.A. concerts would likely
have succeeded in several cities but for interventions by prominent public figures.
In addition, both on- and off-duty police in cities around the United States refused
to act as security when the group went on tour. See Kory Grow, N.W.A’s ‘Straight
Outta Compton’: 12 Things You Didn’t Know, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 8, 2018,
8:46 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/n-w-as-straightoutta-compton-12-things-you-didnt-know-707207/.
255
Amy Nicholson, 9 Truths Cut From Straight Outta Compton, L.A.
WEEKLY (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.laweekly.com/9-truths-cut-from-straightoutta-compton/ (highlighting N.W.A. member, Ice Cube’s, statement that the
group’s promoter conditioned its 1988 concert tour on their not performing Fuck
tha Police). N.W.A. was inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in 2016
and, later that year, their album Straight Outta Compton was inducted into the
Grammy Hall of Fame after it went triple platinum. Peter A. Berry, N.W.A.’s
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The government response to Fuck tha Police, while not typical,
likely also chilled political protest speech by other rap musicians, as
well as artists in other areas, particularly those who have not already
achieved some degree of success and financial security.
Government pressure on political protest in rap continues in the
present day and extends to Caucasian rappers, as evidenced by the
treatment of Marshall Mathers, known professionally as Eminem.256
Mathers reported that Secret Service agents questioned him
following his critique of President Donald Trump in a freestyle rap
on the 2017 Black Entertainment Television (“BET”) Hip Hop
Awards show.257 In short, government responses to rap music
suggest that those interested in protecting political dissent, including
domestic violence victim advocates, should consider the advisability
of a heightened mens rea for public protest context true threats.258
‘Straight Outta Compton’ Album Enters Grammy Hall of Fame, XXL MAG.
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.xxlmag.com/news/2016/11/n-w-a-straight-outtacompton-album-enters-grammy-hall-of-fame/. Additionally, the Library of
Congress’s National Recording Registry, inducted the entire album Straight
Outta Compton into its Registry in 2016. Joshua Barone, Judy Garland and
‘Straight Outta Compton’ Join National Recording Registry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
31, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/arts/music/judy-garland-and-straightoutta-compton-join-national-recording-registry.html.
256
Jessica Schladebeck, Eminem Claims Trump Diss Track Earned Him a
Visit From Secret Service on New ‘Kamikaze’ Album, DAILY NEWS (Aug. 31,
2018, 11:40 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-newseminem-trump-secret-service-kamikaze-album-20180831-story.html. The Secret
Service would neither confirm nor deny questioning Eminem, but it did comment
that it investigates all threats against the President. Id.
257
EMINEM, Like Home, on REVIVAL (Aftermath Entertainment, Shady
Records & Interscope Records 2017) (“Someone get this Aryan a sheet / Time to
bury him, so tell him to prepare to get impeached / Everybody on your feet / This
is where terrorism and heroism meet, square off in the street”); Schladebeck,
supra note 256 (“In the third verse of ‘The Ringer,’ Eminem claims his 2017
freestyle for the BET Hip Hop Awards earned him a visit from the Secret
Service.”); EMINEM, The Ringer, on KAMIKAZE (Aftermath Entertainment, Shady
Records & Interscope Records 2018) (“But I know at least he’s heard it / ‘Cause
Agent Orange just sent the Secret Service / To meet in person to see if I really
think of hurtin’ him”).
258
The subjective test for a true threat has particular significance for political
dissent because a low mens rea generally results in more emphasis on the
objective test and studies suggest such tests are vulnerable to implicit bias. See,
e.g., Brief of the Rutherford Institute, Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner
at 13, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983) (noting that
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3. PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK OF
THREATS
In addition to the particular importance of political speech, the
decision to pursue a public life, with the consequent understanding
of the potential for threats, offers some justification for the provision
of greater constitutional protection for speech on matters of public
concern. Unfortunately, for a significant number of public officials,
whether working at a national or local level, election or appointment
to their posts brings threats of violence, including death threats.259
Public figures also face threats of violence on a regular basis.260
Advance knowledge of the risk, and, in many instances, the
likelihood of threats while in the public eye, presumably renders
receipt of threats somewhat more tolerable for government officials
and public figures.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell
emphasizes the Court’s expectation that public officials and figures
must endure harsher public criticism than other individuals in order
to protect core political speech consistent with the First Amendment,
even when such speech causes severe emotional harm.261 Hustler
involved a lawsuit brought by televangelist and political
the objective test can be applied in a biased manner because factfinders are asked
“whether a reasonable person would feel afraid” but “[s]tereotypes, prejudices . . .
can all contribute to fear, regardless of whether a comment is actually
intimidating.”).
259
See, e.g., Isaac Avilucea, Mayor Kelly Yaede Receives Death Threat,
Woman in Video Shouts, ‘I Wanna Kill You Right Now,’ TRENTONIAN (June 11,
2019),
https://www.trentonian.com/news/mayor-kelly-yaede-receives-deaththreat-woman-in-video-shouts/article_9b03ac6e-8c60-11e9-9a655344d2500882.html; Biran Lisi, School Board Receives Death Threats Following
Arrest and Forcible Removal of Teacher at Meeting, DAILY NEWS (Jan. 10, 2018,
10:59 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/school-board-deaththreats-teacher-removed-meeting-article-1.3748559.
260
See, e.g., Todd Malm, Cardi B Cancels Concert in Indianapolis Due to
Security Threat, CELEBRITY INSIDER (July 31, 2019, 5:27 PM),
https://celebrityinsider.org/cardi-b-cancels-concert-in-indianapolis-due-tosecurity-threat-307041/; Amy Mackelden, Meghan Markle Avoids Newspapers
and Twitter Following Racist Abuse, HARPER’S BAZAAR (March 9, 2019, 10:57
AM),
https://www.harpersbazaar.com/celebrity/latest/a26771371/meghanmarkle-online-trolls-racist-abuse-avoids-twitter/.
261
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (holding that a
public figure cannot recover intentional infliction of emotional distress damages
without proving “a false statement of fact made with ‘actual malice.’”).
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commentator Reverend Jerry Falwell, in response to a “highly
offensive” parody of him in Hustler magazine.262 Recognizing that
“robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment is
bound to produce speech that is critical of those who hold public
office,” the Court applied the New York Times heightened mens rea
standard for defamation against a public official to this case
involving public figure.263 However, the Court did not suggest it
would consider imposing a similar requirement for a private person
to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress.264 Rather,
in the defamation context, the Court has stated “private individuals
are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and
public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.”265
Threats of violence presumably cause more aggregate emotional
harm than other types of speech sufficient for a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. However, the principle that public
protest context speech warrants a heightened level of constitutional
protection that is unavailable for private context speech remains the
same.266 In sum, the Court’s reasoning in Hustler, along with its
other defamation cases and incitement jurisprudence, offer support
for an approach to true threats that provides greater protection for
speech impacting public officials than for words harming private
individuals.267
Some might question the feasibility of a multi-tiered approach
to the subjective test for true threats and argue that such a standard
would be difficult to implement. However, the Supreme Court’s
longstanding defamation jurisprudence belies this concern in that it
has developed to include a greater number of analytical variables
than the proposed approach to true threats.268 In addition, the
Id. at 48 (describing that the parody depicted Falwell’s first sexual
encounter as occurring with his mother in an outhouse).
263
Id. at 50–51 (defining public figures as those “intimately involved in the
resolution of important public questions or, [who] by reason of their fame, shape
events in areas of concern to society at large.”).
264
See id. at 49.
265
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
266
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 52.
267
Cf. id. at 51, 57.
268
See Batchis supra note 183, at 49–50 (noting that in addition to
distinguishing between public official, public figures, and private individuals
allegedly defamed by speech on matters of public versus private concern, the
Supreme Court has varied mens rea requirements-based type of damages at issue).
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Supreme Court’s concern in Watts for the disruption caused by true
threats applied with special force to threats against the President
may suggest a potential objection to a purpose or knowledge
standard for true threats in the public protest context.269 However,
Congress has historically chosen a specific intent standard with
respect to federal laws banning threats against the President despite
undoubtedly wishing to deter threats which interfere with
governmental functions.270 In addition, caselaw suggests that many
individuals who utter threats against the President, as well as other
prominent officials and public figures, will not be deterred by a low
requisite mens rea for true threat liability.271 In short, the Court’s
offhand comments in Watts should not be read as suggesting that it
would find the Constitution required a low mens rea for true threats
in the public protest context.
Finally, some have argued that the advent of the Internet and
other technologies, which have increased the frequency of all types
of threats, suggest that a First Amendment requirement of a purpose
or knowledge standard for true threats will offer insufficient
protection for victims.272 Others have argued that the dynamics of
new communication channels render assessment of the intentions of
269

See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2018) (requiring knowledge and willfulness
for conviction).
271
High profile public officials often draw attention and threats from people
with mental health issues and political extremists willing to risk criminal liability
for their causes. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 41–42 (1975)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (describing how a man suffering from alcoholism
wandered into coffee shop stating that he was Jesus Christ and that he was “going
to go to Washington to ‘whip Nixon’s ass,’ or to ‘kill him in order to save the
United States.’”); Kelly Weill et al., Congressional Shooter Loved Bernie, Hated
‘Racist’ Republicans, and Beat His Daughter, DAILY BEAST,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/congressional-shooter-loved-bernie-sandershated-racist-and-sexist-republicans (last updated June 14, 2017, 11:56 PM) (“The
gunman who attacked members of Congress on Wednesday morning . . . had a
long history of domestic violence that included the use of a gun and hated
Republicans.”).
272
See, e.g., Alison J. Best, Note, Elonis v. United States: The Need to Uphold
Individual Rights to Free Speech While Protecting Victims of Online True
Threats, 75 MD. L. REV. 1127, 1155 (2016) (discussing role of Internet in rise of
true threat litigation in the last decade and arguing in part that “applying a purely
subjective intent standard raises concerns that true threats would be too hard to
prove in the context of social media.”).
270
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a speaker threatening violence more difficult, and they recommend
additional legal protections for those accused of uttering true threats
to avoid overdeterrence of legitimate speech.273 Since
communication technologies continue to evolve rapidly and strong
arguments exist that these developments raise challenges for both
alleged victims and defendants in true threat litigation,274 it seems
ill-advised to attempt to build detailed rules for true threat
jurisprudence on the basis of such issues.275 In sum, the high value
of core political speech and its relative vulnerability to selfcensorship, as well as the assumption of the risk of threats by public
officials and figures, warrant a heightened mens rea for public
protest context true threats pursuant to the First Amendment.
B. Lower Mens Rea for Private Context Threats
In contrast to threats in the public protest context, threats of
violence against private individuals, and threats against public
officials and figures that are not part of a public critique, have little
or no First Amendment value to potentially outweigh the injury
caused by the speech.276 In this regard, private context threats
resemble defamation of a private figure and thus merit a lower level
273

See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Linda Riedemann Norbut, #I [gun
emoji] U: Considering the Context of Online Threats, 106 CAL. L REV. 1886,
1925 (2018) (advocating creation of a procedural mechanism for raising a
“context” defense to a prosecution for threats on social media prior to trial).
274
Jessica L. Opila, Note, How Elonis Failed to Clarify the Analysis of “True
Threats” in Social Media Cases and the Subsequent Need for Congressional
Response, 24 MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L. REV. 95, 97 (2017).
275
See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (“[W]e
cannot appreciate yet [the Cyber Age’s] full dimensions and vast potential to alter
how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be.”); Reno v. Am.
Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the
Internet].”).
276
Elonis Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 27 (“[Negligence] may be a low
standard, but to my mind, it doesn’t eliminate a whole lot of valuable speech at
all.”); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“[R]estricting speech
on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as
limiting speech on matters of public interest: [T]here is no threat to the free and
robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful
dialog of ideas; and the threat of liability does not pose the risk of a reaction of
self-censorship on matters of public import.”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
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of constitutional protection via the mens rea requirement than public
protest context threats. Specifically, the Supreme Court should find
that, for a statement to qualify as a true threat, the Constitution
requires a subjective intent to threaten reflecting at least
recklessness on the part of the speaker for criminal law cases and a
general intent to communicate a true threat, but without regard to
any intent to threaten, in civil matters.
Several considerations beyond the analogy to defamation and
the assumption of a risk of threats by public officials and figures
discussed above support a reading of the First Amendment to require
a lower mens rea to prove a true threat in the private versus public
protest context. First, at the time he receives a true threat, a
government official or public figure will be more likely to have
protection already in place at work, and occasionally at home as
well, and to have access to increased protection in response to a
threat than a private person.277 Access to enhanced public resources
for protection will presumably reduce the actual risk of violence for
a public official or figure and may also blunt the emotional harm of
a threat.278 In addition, the costs of self-help “remedies” for a threat
of violence, such as privately contracted security personnel, are
more likely to be financially accessible to the subset of public
officials and public figures most likely to receive death threats,
namely individuals with high profile government positions or with
celebrity status in the popular culture, than to other threat victims.279
Second, with threats communicated through a private channel,
the particular harm suffered by any victim, whether a public or
private individual, suggests the need to limit the application of a
heightened (purpose or knowledge) mens rea for true threats to only
those threats uttered in the context of a public protest against public
officials and figures. For example, a threat communicated through a
private channel “will often involve an invasion of personal space (a
277
See Donald J. Mihalek & Richard M. Frankel, Protecting US Government
Leaders: Who Gets Security and Why: Analysis, ABC NEWS (Oct. 18, 2019, 5:06
AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/protecting-us-government-leaderssecurity-analysis/story?id=66258938.
278
See id.
279
See, e.g., Kenzie Bryant, The Staggering Price Tag on Safety in the Modern
Celebrity
World,
VANITY
FAIR
(Nov.
4,
2016),
https://www.vanityfair.com/style/2016/11/bodyguard-security-cost-kimkardashian-brad-pitt.
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phone call to the home, for example) that increases the target’s sense
of assault and denies the target any sense of personal refuge or
margin of safety from antagonists.”280 Unlike public protest context
threats, privately communicated threats have “inherently ominous
overtones” and thus cause special harm regardless of the target’s
identity.281 When a government official receives a threat in private,
even when coupled with a reference to a matter of public concern,
she can reasonably assume the speaker does not seek to influence
the marketplace of ideas but instead wishes to intimidate or coerce
her.282 Threats of violence communicated through private channels
to a government official do not advance a broader political
discussion.283
Finally, with respect to private context threats, the victim will
generally have personal connections with the individual making the
threat, rendering total avoidance of that person following a threat
difficult.284 For example, Elonis threatened his estranged wife who,
as a result of their having two minor children in common, would

280

Gey, supra note 230, at 1351.
Id.
282
Id. at 1350–51. Cases involving true threats directed at public officials on
matters of public concern may occasionally present difficulties in discerning
whether those threats were publicly or privately communicated (i.e., a threat
indicating that the speaker will kill the target if he doesn’t vote for particular
legislation sent directly to a legislator’s work email address but also cc’ing several
of the speaker’s friends or family members). See Healy, supra note 237, at 724
(discussing challenges in determining whether speech is public or private in the
context of incitement).
283
See, e.g., United States v. Hoff, 767 F. App’x 614, 622 (6th Cir. 2019)
(defendant left voicemail messages for his Congressman which included
statements such as, “[l]eave Obamacare alone or die.”); United States v. Haddad,
652 F. App’x 460, 462 (7th Cir. 2016) (defendant sent letters to local elected
officials and to oil executives stating “[w]e will so happily and without mercy kill
your families.”). It is also worth noting that not all threats of violence against
public officials in a public setting automatically warrant First Amendment
protection. A person who publicly spews mere personal animus against a
politician that includes a threat of violence but does not refer to matters of public
concern fails to offer any contribution to public debate which the Constitution
aims to protect.
284
See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004, 2006 (2016) (noting
that defendant threatened his wife which prompted her to seek a restraining order
for her and their shared children).
281
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almost certainly face future contact with him.285 Each time a private
individual interacts with a person who has threatened her, the
contact could retraumatize the victim, compounding the emotional
injury from the initial threat.286 However, in most instances, the lack
of a social or an ongoing work related connection will enable public
officials and figures to avoid future contact with people who have
publicly threatened them, thus reducing their risk of suffering actual
violence.287 For example, Elonis also threatened an FBI agent who,
unlike Elonis’ estranged wife, did not have a personal connection to
him and thus could cease all contact with him following the
conclusion of her investigation or perhaps the transfer of that
investigation to another agent.288 A person threatened in a private
context will also be more likely to feel betrayed by the speaker
because of the likelihood of a prior relationship, whereas such
feelings are not generally present for the target of a public protest
context threat.289 Thus, the heightened victim impact of a privately
communicated threat weighs in favor of a lower mens rea for such

285
Id. at 2004. For domestic violence victims who have children in common
with a former intimate partner, courts often include visitation orders to prohibit or
limit contact between a victim and a domestic violence perpetrator. See Debrina
Washington, The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Cases, VERY
WELL FAMILY, https://www.verywellfamily.com/domestic-violence-in-childcustody-cases-2997623 (last updated Sept. 12, 2019) (discussing the impact on
visitation rights for an accused). However, perpetrators frequently do not comply
with these terms imposing contact limitations. Melanie F. Shepard & Annelies K.
Hagemeister, Perspectives of Rural Women: Custody and Visitation with Abusive
Ex-Partners, 28 J. WOMEN & SOC. WORK 165, 167, 171 (2013).
286
Shepard & Hagemeister, supra note 285, at 171. This argument also applies
to public officials and figures threatened through private channels. See Hoff, 767
F. App’x at 620–23.
287
In the case of elected officials, however, First Amendment concerns attach
when trying to block constituents on social media. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d
666, 672–73 (2019) (holding that the chair of a county Board of Supervisors could
not block one of her constituents on Facebook).
288
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2006.
289
Privately communicated threats against public officials addressing matters
of public concern will likewise not cause feelings of personal betrayal unless the
victim happens to have a relationship with the speaker. In any event, under the
multi-tiered approach proposed in this Article, such private context threats would
be subject to a lower mens rea. See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 42
(1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing the threat made by defendant to
officers at a hotel against the President).
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threats whether against public officials, public figures, or private
individuals.
Some have argued that a purpose or knowledge standard for true
threats renders threatening speech likely, and thus serves to expose
potential violence to prevention efforts by law enforcement.290 With
respect to public officials and figures, it seems reasonable to assume
that a heightened mens rea which maximizes free speech protections
will expose potential threats through volatile public expression and
thereby allow for action to increase safety. However, with respect to
threats against private individuals, the threat target is likely to have
a prior relationship with the speaker and thus to be already aware of
the speaker’s ill will.291 As a result, although a heightened mens rea
requirement will generally provide more frequent alerts to potential
danger, it would likely offer little new information to improve the
safety of private individuals threatened with violence.
1. RECKLESSNESS STANDARD FOR TRUE THREATS IN CRIMINAL
CASES
The limited First Amendment value of private context threats
and their high degree of resultant harm argue against a finding that
the Constitution requires a specific intent (purpose or knowledge)
standard for true threat liability. In addition, such a heightened mens
rea would make prosecutions exceedingly difficult in some cases,
including those involving domestic violence for victims who seek to
pursue criminal charges. However, the aversion of many victims to
policies focusing on criminal legal system solutions in response to
domestic violence, to crime in general, or to both, suggests that a
low mens rea requirement pursuant to the First Amendment for true
threat prosecutions would not be in line with their wishes.292 In the
aggregate, the differing perspectives of domestic violence victims
suggest that interpreting the Constitution to require an intermediary
290
Scholars have referred to this justification for a more permissive subjective
test for true threats as the visibility of danger rationale. See e.g., Daniel T. Kobil,
Advocacy On Line: Brandenburg v. Ohio and Speech in the Internet Era, 31 U.
TOL. L. REV. 227, 238 (2000); see also Marc Rohr, “Threatening” Speech: The
Thin Line Between Implicit Threats, Solicitation, and Advocacy of Crime 27
(Nova Southeastern Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 14-002),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2501042.
291
See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2006 (2015).
292
See supra Section II.C.
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level of intent for a criminal conviction for uttering a private context
true threat, namely recklessness on the part of the speaker as to an
intent to threaten, would best serve victim interests overall.293
Some jurisdictions have interpreted statutes criminalizing
threats to require a purpose to threaten for conviction and, in
prosecutions pursuant to such laws, the question of the mens rea
required by the Constitution for a true threat becomes moot.294
However, in jurisdictions which currently allow conviction based
solely on intent to communicate a true threat, meeting the objective
test, a First Amendment requirement of recklessness with respect to
the intent to threaten will increase the difficulty of proving criminal
liability.295 In these instances, the proposed subjective test
(recklessness) for private context true threats in criminal cases will
increase the importance of victim cooperation in prosecutions, and
thus has the potential to enhance respect for victim autonomy.
2. GENERAL INTENT STANDARD FOR TRUE THREATS IN CIVIL
CASES
In contrast to criminal prosecutions for true threats, which arise
in a wide range of circumstances, true threat jurisprudence in civil
cases is implicated almost exclusively with respect to private
context threats in civil protection orders; as a result, domestic
violence victims’ concerns warrant special consideration here.296 In
293

See supra Section II.C.
See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 614 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
295
See, e.g., United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 474, 484–85 (6th Cir. 2012)
(“an objective test . . . asks only whether a reasonable listener would understand
the communication as an expression of intent to injure, permitting a conviction
not because the defendant intended his words to constitute a threat to injure
another but because he should have known others would see it that way.”).
296
See, e.g., Parocha v. Parocha, 418 P.3d 523, 526 (Colo. 2018) (civil
protection order based on private threats to wife); Ngqakayi v. Ngqayaki, No.
2007 CA 85, 2008 WL 4278334, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2008)
(involving civil protection order for threat in private context); Henry v. Henry,
No. 04CA2781, 2005 WL 43888, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (involving civil
protection order for husband’s death threats to wife in private). True threat issues
may also be raised occasionally in the tort context in jurisdictions recognizing
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. See Julie A. Davies, Direct
Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3
(1992). In addition, civil cases involving true threats and related First Amendment
arguments arise in the context of students suing school boards or other school
294
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the civil context, the Supreme Court should find that a subjective
intent to communicate a statement qualifying as a true threat
pursuant to the objective test satisfies any free speech concerns.
Victim interests support a low mens rea for true threats, maximizing
access to civil protection orders, for a number of reasons.297
First, as discussed, domestic violence victims suffer more
acutely from the negative effects of true threats than many other
threat victims, which in turn justifies a lower mens rea with respect
to civil cases than in criminal matters.298 Second, the effects of the
entry of a civil protection order against a defendant, while
significant, are much less severe than the consequences of a criminal
conviction, and thus a lower mens rea here causes fewer concerns
regarding excessive speech regulation than it would in the criminal
context.299
While some jurists may question whether a basis exists upon
which to apply a lower mens rea to true threats in civil versus
criminal cases, this approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
use of penalty-sensitive free speech analysis in its First Amendment
jurisprudence, albeit in a limited number of cases to date.300 As
Professor Michael Coenen has explained, penalty-sensitive free
speech analysis looks to the constitutionality of a speech limitation
in light of the severity of the criminal punishment or civil penalty
attached to it.301 In doing so, penalty sensitivity “posits a positive
correlation between the harshness of the governmental sanction and

authorities following discipline for allegedly threatening speech. See, e.g., Student
Accused of Making Online Threats Directed at Emmerich Manual High School
Arrested, supra note 164. However, in school cases involving threats, a different
standard applies pursuant to Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
297
See supra Section II.B.
298
See supra Section II.A.
299
Jessica Miles, We Are Never Ever Getting Back Together: Domestic
Violence Victims, Defendants, and Due Process, 35 CARDOZO L. R. 141, 151, 174
(2013) (describing the range of potential collateral consequences for defendants
of civil protection orders, including criminal record notations and firearms
restrictions).
300
Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive
Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 995–96 (2012)
[hereinafter Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions].
301
Id. at 1000.
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the strength of the speaker’s First Amendment claim.”302 While the
concept of penalty-sensitive First Amendment analysis remains the
subject of debate, it has garnered increasing scholarly recognition in
recent years.303 Further support for the proposed approach to true
threats may also be found in other areas of constitutional law
reflecting penalty sensitivity by distinguishing between rights
available in civil and criminal cases (i.e., right to counsel).304
Third, any determination that liability for a true threat requires
proof of the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten “will create a
significant hurdle to the issuance of protection orders for
victims.”305 While subjective intent is “by its nature . . . difficult to
demonstrate,”306 establishing intent would likely be more
challenging in domestic violence matters, as compared to other true
threat cases, due to the special ability of many domestic violence
perpetrators for deception.307 Domestic violence perpetrators gain
302

Id.
See, e.g., id. at 995 (arguing “[p]enalty-sensitive free speech may be less
prevalent than its penalty-neutral counterpart, but it is by no means nonexistent.”); Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 1533, 1601 (2017) (arguing that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes discussed
“speech specific, penalty-sensitive concerns” in his dissent in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)); Margo Kaminski, Copyright Crime and
Punishment: The First Amendment’s Proportionality Problem, 73 MD. L. REV.
587, 590 (2014) (arguing “courts should . . . reintegrate elements of
proportionality analysis into First Amendment jurisprudence.”); Heidi Kitrosser,
Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First Amendment
Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. NAT’L L. & POL’Y 409,
441 (2013) (arguing for the application of the balancing test in Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), in the context of civil and administrative sanctions
and strict scrutiny for criminal sanctions).
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Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions, supra note 300, at 1022–26; see also
Batchis supra note 183, at 44 (suggesting “[a] nuanced doctrinal rule governing
the true threats category might distinguish among various possible sanctions that
would apply to true threats” with “[a] higher level of intent . . . required to ratchetup the sanctions imposed.”).
305
Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project
and Professor Margaret Drew as Amici Curiae, supra note 21, at 28–29.
306
United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1997).
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POWER AND CONTROL WHEEL, supra note 108; see also Wheels, DOMESTIC
ABUSE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, https://www.theduluthmodel.org/wheels/ (last
accessed Jan. 26, 2020) (describing Power and Control Wheel utilized by wide
range of professionals including court personnel, law enforcement, and
prosecutors in the United States as well as other countries).
303

2020]

STRAIGHT OUTTA SCOTUS

777

and maintain power and control over their victims with a range of
abusive behaviors, many of which involve manipulation, as perhaps
best represented in the Power and Control Wheel developed by
domestic violence experts.308 Abusive behavioral strategies include
responding to domestic violence allegations by “minimizing,
denying [the abuse], and blaming [the victim].”309 In true threat
litigation, perpetrators can use these manipulative skills to claim that
they had no intent to threaten the victim, but rather merely sought to
“vent their frustration, to make a joke, [or] to express themselves
artistically.”310 Domestic violence perpetrators tend to be successful
in deceiving fact finders as to their intentions, and research
establishes that fact finders demonstrate bias on issues of credibility
in favor of perpetrators to the detriment of domestic violence
victims.311
Further complicating problems of proof for a domestic violence
victim, a former intimate partner can use facially ambiguous words
that nonetheless clearly communicate a threat to her based on the
couple’s shared history, which can then aid the defendant in his
efforts to deny his intent to threaten her.312 During oral argument in
308

POWER AND CONTROL WHEEL, supra note 108; see also Wheels, supra note

307.
309

POWER AND CONTROL WHEEL, supra note 108 (listing strategies as
“[m]aking light of the abuse,” “[s]aying the abuse didn’t happen,” or “[s]aying
she caused it.”).
310
Brief Amici Curiae the National Network to End Domestic Violence, et al.,
supra note 21, at 21–22; see also Chemaly & Franks, supra note 155 (noting that
subjective intent requirement for true threats “might allow domestic violence
abusers to create plausible defenses for themselves by claiming that they never
really ‘meant’ their threats as threats.”).
311
DAVID ADAMS, WHY DO THEY KILL? MEN WHO MURDER THEIR INTIMATE
PARTNERS 26 (2007) (“Many batterers avoid detection . . . precisely because they
do not fit the stereotypes about them.”); Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child
Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and
Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & LAW 657, 690–92
(2003) (noting that judges’ credibility assessments are often incorrect in this
context because “many common assumptions about witness credibility backfire
when applied to victims and perpetrators of domestic violence.”); see also Aníbal
Rosario-Lebrón, Evidence’s #MeToo Moment, 74 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 49–56
(2019) (explaining how character for truthfulness evidence is used to play on preexisting biases toward victims of domestic violence).
312
Joanne Belknap et al., The Roles of Phones and Computers in Threatening
and Abusing Women Victims of Male Intimate Partner Abuse, 19 DUKE J. GENDER
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Elonis, Justice Alito recognized that a heightened mens rea for true
threats would pose special problems for domestic violence victims,
commenting that such a rule would offer “a roadmap for threatening
a spouse and getting away with it” by “put[ting] [the threat] in rhyme
and . . . say[ing], I’m an aspiring rap artist.”313
Finally, whereas in criminal cases, implicit bias concerns
generally focus on discrimination against defendants, in civil
protection order cases, implicit bias will be more likely to
disadvantage domestic violence victims than defendants.314
Specifically, because most intimate partner pairings in the United
States are monoracial and the vast majority of domestic violence
victims are women, to the extent implicit or explicit biases factor
into civil protection order decisions, an inference can be drawn that
gender will generally be the most salient point on which implicit
bias may impact outcomes.315 Given research findings that the
majority of Americans hold implicit biases in many areas in favor
of men over women, in civil protection order cases, any gender bias
will generally inure in favor of male defendants.316 Similarly, with
respect to bias against immigrants, domestic violence victims are
more likely to be immigrants—particularly undocumented
immigrants—than their former intimate partners, given the
dynamics of power and control inherent in domestic violence.317 As
a result, any bias against immigrants in adjudicating civil protection
L. & POL’Y 373, 379 (2012) (former intimate partner stalkers typically have more
access to information than stranger or acquaintance stalkers including “secrets,
words and behaviors that are particularly humiliating or frightening to their
victims.”).
313
Elonis Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 59.
314
See Meier, supra note 312, at 690–91 (noting that domestic violence
batterers are more likely to be convincing witnesses, while victim’s demeanors
“do not enhance women’s credibility in the eyes of a judge or other evaluator.”).
315
See supra note 6 and accompanying text; WENDY WANG, THE RISE OF
INTERMARRIAGE,
PEW
RES.
CTR.
(Feb.
16,
2012),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/02/16/the-rise-of-intermarriage/ (“About
15% of all new marriages in the United States in 2010 were between spouses of a
different race.”).
316
See Rosario-Lebrón, supra note 312, at 19–37; Pragya Agarwal, Here Is
How Unconscious Bias Holds Women Back, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2018, 10:35 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/pragyaagarwaleurope/2018/12/17/here-is-howunconscious-bias-holds-women-back/#3bdf17e62d4f.
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order cases will likely favor defendants. Full consideration of all
potential types of implicit bias which can arise in civil protection
order hearings is beyond the scope of this Article. However, as the
foregoing analysis suggests, domestic violence victims, rather than
defendants, are more likely to be disadvantaged by implicit bias in
civil protection order cases.318 In sum, in light of the serious harm
true threats cause domestic violence victims and the relatively
modest consequences of a civil protection order for defendants in
comparison to criminal penalties, as well as the disadvantages faced
by domestic violence victims in litigating these cases, the balance
weighs in favor of a subjective test requiring only a general intent to
communicate an objective true threat for liability.
CONCLUSION
True threat jurisprudence offers the opportunity for the Supreme
Court to utilize insights from First Amendment decisions regarding
other categories of unprotected speech, particularly defamation and
incitement, to reflect the optimal constitutional balancing of free
speech rights and protection of individuals, in particular domestic
violence victims, from harm. In light of this guidance, the Court
should use a multi-tiered approach to the question of the
constitutionally requisite mens rea that must be coupled with a
finding pursuant to the objective test for a true threat. This multitiered standard should require, first, that public protest context
threats of violence (i.e., against public officials and figures and
publicly communicated on matters of public concern) receive
heightened constitutional protection: a specific intent to threaten
(purpose or knowledge) standard for liability. Second, private
context threats (i.e., privately communicated threats whether against
private individuals or public officials or figures) should require an
intermediate level of subjective intent to threaten (recklessness) for
a criminal conviction. Finally, for entry of a civil protection order or
other civil judgment, private context threats should require only a
general intent to communicate an objectively threatening statement
and not a subjective, specific intent to threaten. True threat
jurisprudence gives domestic violence advocates an opportunity to
continue to shift the priorities of the feminist anti-violence
318

See supra Section IV.B.2.
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movement away from prioritizing criminalization—which has often
been ineffective and had unintended consequences—to instead
focus on preventing and remedying domestic violence through civil
protection orders and other solutions which better reflect the
concerns of all victims. In working to ensure that true threat
jurisprudence maximizes civil protection order access and provides
some level of criminal legal system relief from threats, while also
offering a heightened constitutional buffer for impassioned political
protest, advocates can improve society’s effectiveness in responding
to domestic violence.

